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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The term virtual environment (VE) can be used to describe many different types 
of systems.  The scope of this work is centered in the context of networked visual VEs, in 
which participants are interacting with other participants in a ‘real-time’ manner.  
Participants are depicted visually through the use of an image/model (commonly referred 
to as an ‘avatar’) in a two- or three-dimensional manner.  These are different from non-
visual collaborative virtual environments (CVEs) and virtual organizations (VOs) that 
share resources and data strictly for computational reasons, and have no requirement for 
real-time visual depictions of the interactions.  
A special type of networked visual virtual environment is the Run-Time 
Extensible Virtual Environments (RTEVEs).  Traditional VEs can only operate with 
objects and behaviors that are present when the VE was started; if any kind of new object 
type needs to be added to the VE, the VE would need to be halted, the new object-type 
inserted into the database, and then the VE restarted.  RTEVEs are useful for systems that 
require continuous operation coupled with the ability to add new objects, behavior, and 
functionality at runtime.  This also requires that not only data also code modules be 
passed over the network.   
  Networked visual VEs must have significant minimum latency requirements in 
order to retain a sense of presence. The VE must respond and interact with other 
participants within the expected human reaction times. [Singhal99]. Given these 
limitations, security, which unavoidably adds to latency, has usually been sacrificed or 
ignored. Contributing to this tendency has been a lack of requirements for security in VEs 
designed for academic research.  Military VEs, such as SIMNET (Simulator Networking) 
[Singhal99], were one of the few VE areas that had a requirement for security. This 
requirement was typically met by three techniques: physical security for the hosts and 
local area network; dedicated wide area networks, not accessible from public networks; 
and network link layer encryption provided by dedicated hardware for wide area network 
communications.  With the dramatic increase in computing and network speed over the 
2 
past few years, networked VEs have become more widespread. Commodity, low-cost 
desktop PCs networked over high speed links can be used as fully participating hosts in 
visual networked VEs.  And this has allowed the widespread deployment of VE 
applications on public networks that are not secured against attack. This new 
environment cannot use the same measures that the military used to secure their VEs. 
LANs cannot always be physically secured against all intruders in a shared environment, 
and WAN connections must be shared with other users. Link layer security is sometimes 
impractical for certain types of VE communications.  As security-sensitive VE 
applications are developed for networked VEs, these security issues must be addressed.  
The increase in computing power has also allowed mechanisms that were previously 
considered impractical to be deployed.        
NPSNET-V was developed at the Naval Postgraduate School and is a framework 
for the development and research of RTEVE applications.  A main design goal of 
NPSNET-V is to be flexible and deployable on public networks.  Therefore, security of 
the network cannot be assumed.  Consequently, any desired level of security must reside 
within the application itself.   
The motivation for this thesis is twofold.  The first goal is to develop a taxonomy 
that identifies the areas of security concern within the domain of RTEVEs.  The second 
goal is to provide the foundation for a security capability within NPSNET-V, and identify 
its impact on Quality of Service (QOS).     
B. THESIS STATEMENT  
The use of security-enabling filters that provide for the encryption, sequencing, 
and integrity of data packets within an RTEVE are effective at addressing relevant 
RTEVE Information Assurance (IA) concerns with minimal impact on the QOS areas of 
delay and bandwidth.         
C. METHODOLOGY 
This section describes the overall methodology that was followed in developing a 
taxonomy describing twenty-five security related areas within RTEVEs, and the 
subsequent design and analysis of the basic security management system that was 
designed for NPSNET-V.   Since NPSNET-V initially had no security capabilities, and a 
VE’s main characteristic is the multitude of packets that are exchanged when updating 
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state information, the design for this base system revolved around the data transmission 
flows for entity update information.  And, in keeping with the QOS concerns that are 
central to networked systems, various analyses were performed to determine the impact 
of the added security mechanisms.      
1. Review of Virtual Environments 
A look into the security of RTEVEs required first an understanding of the typical 
VE architecture, the desired characteristics of effective VEs, and the QOS issues to be 
considered when determining what security measures to use.  A comprehensive look at 
VEs can be found in [Singhal99]. 
2. Analysis of RTEVE Architecture, Case Study of NPSNET-V 
In order to identify pertinent security-related concerns and areas within the realm 
of RTEVEs, an actual RTEVE architecture, NPSNET-V was reviewed and analyzed.  
Analysis of its structure and design allowed for the breakdown of the system into 5 
identified functional areas. 
3. Review of Related Security Research 
Much research has been performed in the topic of information assurance (IA).  
However, security research specific to VEs has been somewhat limited.  A thorough 
review of research applicable to VE security was undertaken, with the intent of assisting 
in the development of the taxonomy, and providing information about the policy and 
mechanisms that can be applied to address the identified RTEVE security areas.   
4. Develop A Taxonomy of RTEVE Security Concerns 
The analysis of NPSNET-V and the study of security technology research were 
then used to develop a taxonomy describing twenty-five RTEVE security areas.  The 
developed taxonomy is further explained through the use of scenarios that assist in 
understanding the concepts.  Further, the research was used to identify security measures 
applicable in addressing individual and combined areas of the taxonomy. 
5. Design and Implementation of the NSMS 
Having identified the need to address security in the entity state data packet 
transmission infrastructure, and having the knowledge of appropriate mechanism to 
employ, the design and implementation of the SMS was the next logical step.  An 
appropriate design was developed and implementation executed.  Since NPSNET-V is a 
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Java-based framework, the Java Security Application Programming Interface (API) was 
identified as the appropriate basis of providing security functionality for the NSMS.  The 
design includes a server-client authentication process with symmetric key-distribution for 
encryption of communication links.  Functionality of the system provides for 
communication enciphering and deciphering, packet data integrity verifications, and 
packet sequencing operations.   
Four of the twenty-five identified areas are addressed by the designed system.  
These areas are: 
· Component authentication: addressed by the authentication of one 
particular type of component, the StandardSecurityManager, via digital 
certificates. 
·  Communication authentication: addressed by applications having 
knowledge of a secret key. 
· Communication integrity: addressed through the use of integrity verifying 
message digests. 
· Communication confidentiality: addressed through the use of symmetric 
key encryption.         
6. Analysis of NSMS Capabilities on QOS  
Once the implementation was functional and in place, we then studied the impact 
of the functional areas of the NSMS on QOS, primarily bandwidth and delay.        
D. RESULTS 
This work has resulted in a greater understanding of the domain of security within 
RTEVEs, as evinced by the developed matrix of twenty-five RTEVE security areas.  It 
must be remembered, that this taxonomy only covers the RTEVE application realm itself, 
and assumes other areas of information assurance are handled by the systems on which 
RTEVEs are executed.  Mechanisms exist that can be used to address these areas, but 
these can come at the cost of QOS which is even especially vital for VE applications.   
The development of the NPSNET-V Security Management System (NSMS) 
indicates that it is feasible to incorporate entity state update data security within RTEVEs.  
5 
Additionally, the security mechanisms that can be applied to the data packet exchange 
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II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK  
This chapter provides the reader with an understanding of why security is relevant 
to VEs, an overview of VEs, as well as a discussion on RTEVEs using NPSNET-V as a 
case study.  An overview of current security work relevant to VEs is presented, followed 
by an overview on technologies used in the implementation of the NSMS. 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Historically, the Department of Defense was the primary developer of networked 
VEs.  Its early work with training simulators, such as SIMNET (SIMulator NETworking) 
paved the way for today’s VEs [Singhal99].  These early VE efforts required large 
amounts of computing resources and specialized systems, and thus security of those VEs 
rested primarily on the fact that the networks were not directly accessible via the Internet. 
 With the proliferation of PC workstations, and their increasing computing power, 
distributed, real-time VEs are becoming more commonplace and are used for a multitude 
of applications ranging from training to manufacturing and gaming.  Their architectures 
have traditionally been driven by QOS considerations, with little concern paid to security 
issues. However, the new application domains have significant security requirements, 
explicitly recognized or not, that may involve proprietary or valuable information.    
B. SECURITY AND VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS 
This section briefly discusses the need for security within VEs.  It also discusses 
the idea of a continuum of levels of support for IA, and how the unique characteristics of 
various VE applications may require specialized security measures.  
1. Why Security is Necessary 
More and more organizations have realized what the on-line gaming industry and 
military have known for years: VEs are more revenue generating applications, cost 
cutting team training and development tools, and safe training environments.  As the 
value and potential of VEs become better understood, they will likely be utilized for an 
ever greater diversity of applications.  Many of these VEs will be used in sensitive 
contexts that make them targets of malicious entities.  Consider the following examples: 
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Example #1: Manufacturers may use VEs for virtual prototyping, allowing 
engineers at several locations to make design decisions in a collaborative envi-
ronment in which they are all virtually present and observe proprietary 
information.  A competitor, engaging in industrial espionage, might be able to 
view the proprietary information and use it to the their advantage in the 
marketplace, or they may modify or destroy the information to mislead or disrupt 
the target corporation. 
Example #2: A military commander may utilize a VE to visualize the battlefield 
and all pertinent intelligence information during a conflict.  An adversary that is 
able to exploit weaknesses in the VE could inject false information, causing the 
commander to make misinformed decisions, such as mistakenly sending troops 
into an orchestrated ambush. 
2. Varying Levels of Security 
As touched on above, the level of security of an individual VE will be driven 
primarily by the organizations using the VE and the context in which the VE will be 
used.  Consideration must be given to tradeoffs such as the cost to develop and maintain 
the system, system performance as determined through quality of service measurements, 
and the risk and consequences of a security compromise.   
Some VEs will need high levels of security, and run on trusted systems with 
mandatory access control policies and multiple authentication protocols, while others 
may not require anything at all and are completely open to all potential users.  Most, 
however, will require some form of minimal-to-medium levels of security controls due to 
low risk or consequences associated with the misuse of these systems.  Examples follow: 
Low-level example: An example here might include an unclassified 
technical trainer for tasks such as vehicle repair.  Misuse of this system would not 
be life threatening or financially onerous; therefore high levels of security might 
not be cost-effective, and create an unnecessary burden in their use.    
Mid-level example: Examples in this category include online game 
playing.  Companies receive significant revenue for providing these services to 
the public, but they are also popular targets for malicious or over-enthusiastic 
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hackers. Lack of security can result in degraded game play as some participants 
exploit security weaknesses in the system. As a result, overall enjoyment of the 
game by the public is reduced, and the service provider’s revenue suffers 
accordingly. 
High-level example: Examples in this category might include a VE 
intended for use by battlefield commanders for information visualization during a 
conflict.  The information provided may be used to develop sensitive tactics and 
decisions, and would require protection; but a requirement for mobility and 
dynamic capabilities may call for a trade-off in reduced security capability.    
Very high-level example: A VE used as part of a national strategic system 
for visualization of intelligence information.  Intelligence sources, sensitive 
relationships, covert operations could all be gleaned from information available in 
the system, and thus would require the utmost in security protection. 
Two other dimensions to VE security are multilevel security and com-
partmentalization.  For example, a military application of a VE could be designed to 
allow senior commanders to possess sensitive intelligence information while denying it to 
personnel at lower levels of the chain–of–command, even though both are present in the 
same area of the virtual environment. 
C. OVERVIEW OF VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS 
A VE is an environment in which physically separated participants have the 
ability to see, communicate, and ‘physically’ interact with each other within a computer-
generated world.  A feeling of a shared space and time are prerequisites. 
In a VE, each user controls one or more entities.  These entities are represented 
inside the virtual world by a visual model that all other users can see and interact with.  
The design of the VE application determines the level of realism and interaction 
experienced by the participants through such features as its physics-based model 
foundation, rendering, and rules of interaction. 
This section presents a brief overview of VEs, including their desired 
characteristics, basic architecture, and quality of service concerns.  We conclude with a 
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brief overview of RTEVEs.  For a detailed discussion of what VEs are, and their 
architecture, design and potentials, refer to [Capps97], [Macedonia97], or [Singhal99]. 
1. Characteristics of an Effective VE 
Capps and Stotts [Capps97] list attributes of an effective VE architecture, 
classifying them into four categories:  network topology, interoperability, composability, 
and rapid evolution.  They stated the difficulty of simultaneously addressing attributes in 
all four categories, and that the then-current examples of VE architectures were deficient 
in one or more of the categories.  This evaluation still holds true today, and may continue 
to do so. 
Network Topology.  A good topology will allow for large, if not infinite, 
scalability in the number of participants in the VE.  It will allow for a graceful 
degradation of the simulation, in the event that any network resource is lost.  It 
must also ensure adequate performance for each participant regardless of the 
communication capabilities they possess (e.g., T1, ADSL, and modem). 
Interoperability.  The ability of one VE to transfer an object to another VE 
without the loss of information is a highly desired attribute.  Control of the object 
must be transferable, including the physical and behavioral properties.  If an 
object explodes in one VE after a certain sequence of events, then the same object 
should be able to explode in the other VE given the identical circumstances. 
Composability.  It should be possible to easily create a VE through the 
union of two separate VEs.  The new VE’s functionality would be comprised 
completely of the functionality sets of the two original VEs.  This resulting VE 
would literally be a union of the two parent VEs in every way, both at start-up and 
during runtime, without undesirable emergent properties. 
Rapid Evolution.  The ability to rapidly incorporate new technology into a 
VE with a minimal degree of modification to existing components is essential for 
ease of modification, research, and expansion.  For example, creating a module 
with the new desired behavior and simply adding the module to the VE with little 
modification elsewhere in the application.  
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To date the only attribute that has been reasonably well implemented is that of a 
network topology. 
2. Special Case:  Runtime Extensible VEs (RTEVEs) 
Traditional VEs are considered non-extensible (i.e., static) in that new types of 
objects and functionality cannot be incorporated in them while they are executing.  In 
order to add new functionality and objects to conventional VEs the application must be 
halted, the new item added to the database or application, and then application restarted.  
In contrast, an RTEVE permits the runtime introduction of new objects and functionality, 
thus allowing for the runtime extensibility of the system, without stopping and restarting 
the application.  If an executing application has a need for previously unknown capability 
or object the VE’s database can be updated with the new information, and the VE 
application can load this information at runtime. New code components can be loaded 
from the database, and therein lies the major new vulnerability of RTEVEs: code 
modules may maliciously attack the VE. However, this extensibility trait is essential for 
VE applications that cannot be halted to update their capabilities and data sets.  To date, 
the only visual RTEVEs in existence are hosted within research institutions. 
3. Architecture 
A distributed VE is comprised of four basic components: copies of the VE ap-
plication, workstations, database(s), and a network.  In general, there are multiple copies 
of the VE application residing on multiple workstations that tap into a database for 
information and share data over a network.  The data that is to be shared may be a 
combination of administrative communications, entity-data updates, and streaming video, 
audio, or other data.  For maximum effectiveness and utility, the overall architecture must 
allow for unrestrained data sharing and operation within the QOS constraints that are 
decided upon by the developer or user of the application VE.  These QOS constraints are 
discussed in detail in section C.3. of this chapter.     
VE Application.  A VE application must be able to accurately maintain 
state information for however many entities are present within the area of view of 
the host entity of that application.  It must correctly maintain each entity’s state, 
respond appropriately to user input, and display accurate views of the portion of 
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the environment we are interested in.  Finally, it must also manage the 
transmission and reception of data and support communications. 
Workstations.  Every VE application must run on a workstation, each one 
equipped with appropriate networked multimedia capabilities (e.g., network 
connection, graphics card, and sound card). 
Database.  There must be one or more databases or repositories, either 
centralized or distributed, that contain data needed for every application should 
have access to.  This information is used to create the environment (e.g., terrain, 
structures) and every possible object that can exist.   
Network.  The design of the network communication infrastructure is 
crucial to the workings of the VE.  An infrastructure design is application 
dependent; that is, the needs of the VE will determine what the design will look 
like (e.g., reliable vs. unreliable data communications).  In general, there will be 
administrative processes that require reliable communications, typically in a 
server-client based structure using TCP/IP communications.  Likewise, entity 
state updates that require a constant transmission of entity state protocol packet 
data units (ESPDUs) between all participants might find a multicast protocol 
useful, especially in environments where participant numbers is large, and the loss 
of some packets will not impact the performance of the system because newer 
packets are not far behind.    
4. Quality of Service Concerns 
The illusion of real-time interaction is a requirement for a VE, an effect that is 
sometimes described as presence.  This illusion is influenced by the rate at which a VE’s 
screen representation is updated and the degree to which interactions with objects in the 
VE appear to be instantaneous and natural.  If the entity update rate is too slow, the VE 
appears to be jerky and therefore the user lacks a sense of presence. The generally 
accepted standard update rate for a VE is 30 Hz; at lower rates the human eye begins to 
notice non-continuous motion. [Grabner01] This originally required that an entity’s state 
information be updated at the same rate as the VE.  However, it was soon recognized that 
the visual representation on the screen could be decoupled from network entity state 
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updates via dead-reckoning algorithms or other techniques. Since entities tend to keep 
doing what they’re already doing, we can make intelligent guesses about their current 
state even without constant entity state updates from the network. The use of network-
based entity state updates in general means that network QOS has a significant impact on 
perceptions of presence. The basic network QOS concerns as identified by [Black00] are: 
bandwidth, delay (also known as latency), jitter, and traffic loss.  This thesis concentrates 
on the QOS areas of Bandwidth and Delay. 
a. Bandwidth  
Bandwidth is quantity of data delivered by the network to a host per unit 
time.  Different network hardware technologies have different speeds. In common public 
usage at this time the bandwidth available ranges from 56 KBS dial-up modems to 1 
gigabit per second Ethernet connections.  The choice of which network technology to use 
depends on many factors, including cost and distance limitations.  VE systems must take 
these issues into account in order to develop an appropriate data sharing protocol that 
avoids network bandwidth saturation, and consequently loss of near real-time 
interactions.  The application-controlled items that affect this area the most are the size 
and number of data packets that are being transmitted within the network.  
Generally speaking, more participants in a VE require more bandwidth, 
since the greater numbers of entities require more state updates.  Higher fidelity VEs with 
more frequent entity state updates can also require higher bandwidth.  Some VEs include 
interactive audio or streaming video, which can tax the bandwidth budget.  All these 
factors must be taken into account when designing the capabilities and architecture of the 
VE. 
b. Delay 
In order to maintain an acceptable level of synchronization between the 
participants of the VE, delay has to be within acceptable limits.  Delay can be broken 
down into two types: network delay, and application delay.     
Network Delay.  Network delay is the amount of time that a bit takes to 
pass through the network from one workstation to another.  It is the delay induced 
primarily by the constraint of signals traveling through the network.  This varies 
depending on the network technology (e.g., lasers, fiber optic lines, copper lines, 
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satellite radio transmissions).  Network delay is bounded at the lower end by the 
speed of light, which is approximately 8.25 milliseconds per time zone 
[Cheshire96].  Communications via geosynchronous satellite require a round trip 
to orbit and back, a distance of about 50,000 miles or about 500 milliseconds of 
latency. This is only the theoretical lower bound; actual network delay is often 
much higher due to delays introduced by the networking equipment or 
communications that occur at less than the speed of light.  Further details can be 
found in [Comer00].  
Application Delay.  Application delay is the amount of time that the 
workstation itself takes to process the information from the point of identifying 
the necessity to transmit the data, to the time a packet is formed, is processed by 
the operating system, and is actually placed on the network.  Consequently, it also 
includes the time between the packet’s receipt from the network by the destination 
host, to when the actual data is received by the application’s function that requires 
the needed data; this period includes the time needed to process the packet, and 
remove and hand the data to the necessary module in the application.  Every step 
that the data must go through when in the operating system and in the application 
will induce added delay.  Excessive cumulative delay can make it difficult to 
maintain a synchronized interactive VE.  
Latency and delay must be kept within an acceptable, pre-established 
window that will ensure the desired level of world-consistency and feeling of presence; 
the illusion of real-time interaction is difficult to maintain if these are too great.  As 
discussed, there are many factors to take into account when determining the possible 
latency and delay that may be present in a system.   
D. OVERVIEW OF AN RTEVE (NPSNET-V) 
This section provides a brief history and introduction of NPSNET-V.  Here we 
dissect NPSNET-V into five functional areas that are of concern when dealing with 
information assurance. 
1. Background 
The NPSNET program of the Naval Postgraduate School started in 1990 as a 
research platform for networked virtual environment technology.  It is now in its fifth 
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iteration and known as NPSNET-V.   As stated by McGregor and Kapolka, the dream of 
NPSNET-V is for it to be “…a framework for fully distributed, component based, 
persistent, networked virtual worlds, extensible at runtime and scalable to infinite size on 
the Internet.” [McGregor01]   
 In the course of designing and implementing the original architecture of 
NPSNET-V, the developers realized that a unified hierarchical component framework 
was required to realize the goals of the program; this prompted a complete change in the 
structure of the application.  For details on the original architecture of NPSNET-V, refer 
to [Washington01] and [Wathen01].   
A full description of the NPSNET-V architecture and interactions would be too 
extensive for the scope of this work; therefore, only an overview of the component areas 
that play into the security scope will be covered.  For a more detailed description of the 
program and the current architecture of NPSNET-V, refer to [Capps00], [McGregor01], 
and [Kapolka02]. 
2. Functional Component Areas 
Programmed using the Java object-oriented language, NPSNET-V is not a virtual 
world system itself, but a component-based framework used to build virtual worlds by 
combining functional modules in manners that produce desired characteristics.  The run-
time extensibility of NPSNET-V is achieved through the ability of incorporating these 
functional modules into the system during runtime without the need to halt the system, 
and without prior knowledge of the individual module behaviors.  This allows for entirely 
new behavior to be added to the VE ‘on-the-fly.’  In terms of exploitable areas, 
NPSNET-V can be divided into the five functional areas identified in Table 1, and 
explained below.     
Table 1.   Areas of RTEVE Functionality 
Area Description 
Configuration Files The file that contains the ‘blueprints’ for the VE 
Communications The communication infrastructure of the VE 
Database The database of all necessary data for the VE 
Components The functional code modules that are used to build the VE and  
 its capabilities 
Temporal The time coordination system 
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a. Configuration File 
Each virtual world built using the NPSNET-V architecture requires an 
XML configuration file that delineates the behaviors and structure of the world.  This file 
is a template used by the NPSNET-V application to build the internal hierarchical 
component structure of the desired VE.  The file identifies world-state information, as 
well as the name of components needed for the structure nodes.  The application then 
downloads and assimilates the needed modules into the component framework.  An 
example configuration file and description is contained in appendix A.     
b. Component Framework 
NPSNET-V uses a component framework to maintain a hierarchical tree 
structure of interconnected functional components; this tree is anchored about the 
‘kernel’ of the application, which contains a common, basic set of services primarily 
related to loading new components.  An XML initialization file that is unique to each 
application loads components necessary for that application. During runtime, the 
capabilities of the application can be extended by the incorporation of new component 
modules into the framework as they are needed. 
These components include modules such as models, which represent the 
abstract internal state of entities; controllers that are used to implement communication 
protocols;; views, which are responsible for visually displaying objects.  Since the 
application is built on Java technology, Java archive (Jar) files are used to hold the class 
objects for these modules.  
During execution, an application may require a previously unknown 
component.  Armed with the name of the component, the application communicates with 
an LDAP server and retrieves a URL that identifies the location of that component’s Jar 
file.  It then retrieves the component and incorporates it into the runtime component 
structure.   
Figure 1 depicts an example NPSNET-V application with the hierarchical 
component structure.  This is a visual depiction of the application created by the 
configuration file in Appendix A.  Note that the ‘base.xml’, ‘gui.xml’, and ‘dis.xml’ are 
included configuration files, but their tree structures are not depicted. 
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Figure 1.   Example NPSNET-V Application Structure 
 
c. Database Architecture 
The requirements and capabilities desired in any particular VE will drive 
the requisite database structure to support it.  In general, there are three types of databases 
required. The first maintains the XML configuration files.  The second are LDAP servers 
that contain the URLs needed for component discovery.  The third is the support database 
structure comprised of multiple HTTP servers that contain the component archive files, 
and specialized servers providing data such as audio/video streams and terrain data.   
d. Network Communications Architecture 
Multiple types of communication channels are formed throughout the 
course of an application’s life; from reliable TCP connections to unreliable UDP 
connections, including multicast and broadcast.  These communication paths fall within 
two groupings.  The first revolves around administrative communications, which deal 
with required exchanges necessary for the proper functioning of the application.  These 
will generally always be reliable TCP type connections and include component/XML file 


























The second style of communications is that of peer-to-peer entity state 
update transmissions over reliable or unreliable communications methods such as 
multicast or UDP connections.  These entity state update communications are the heart of 
the distributed nature of a VE, and often contain information such as the entity position, 
orientation, or speed.  In the Distributed Interactive Simulation communications protocol 
defined by IEEE standard 1278.1, a packet that contains this information is referred to as 
an Entity State Protocol Data Unit, or ESPDU    
The third form of communications includes the passing of object code 
modules, terrain data, and streaming audio/video from HTTP and specialized servers.  
These data will also be transmitted over a combination of reliable and unreliable 
connection methods. 
Figure 2 depicts an example of the network connections that may be 
formed during a typical session.  The dotted lines indicate unreliable multicast channels 
used to transfer entity state updates and interactions between peers.  Solid lines represent 
the transient reliable connections used to download resources from the World Wide Web, 










Figure 2.   Overview of Network Connection (From Ref [Salles02]) 
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e. Temporal Information 
In order to create a synchronized space in which participants can 
accurately collaborate and interact, a shared ‘time-space’ must exist. Hosts on TCP/IP 
networks typically have system clocks, but these clocks are notorious for not being 
synchronized. The Network Time Protocol (NTP) is a standards-based service that can be 
used to synchronize system clocks distributed on the Internet to a common time 
[Mills99].   A TimeProvider module can be incorporated into the NPSNET-V framework; 
this module will supply a time service based on however the module is implemented, 
typically by querying the system clock on the local host.         
E. VE SECURITY EFFORTS AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY 
Computer, network, and database security have all been the subject of much 
research.  However, the ever-increasing complexity of computers and the perseverance of 
hackers ensure that these will continue to be relevant areas of discussion. General 
network and information assurance issues that transcend systems have been well 
researched; refer to [Jayaram97] and [Landwehr94].     
As for VE security, limited research has been performed.  Deployed systems often 
either ignore security completely or run on trusted networks and hosts that have limited 
access.  As VEs have become more widespread and developed revenue-generating 
business models security has become more important.  In the research community, VE 
security has generally been treated as an afterthought or of low priority in relation to 
other issues, such as performance and reliability.  SIMNET [Singhal99], which had a 
genuine security requirement, addressed security through measures external to the VE. 
Bamboo [Smith00] is an exception; it included digital certificates to authenticate 
components loaded across the network.  The development of viable business models in 
the environment that the research community ultimately serves, along with advancing 
hardware and the ubiquity of the unsecured public Internet, have increased interest in VE 
security.  Research and training venues in the past have been protected via physical 
computer security and identification and authorization schemes inherent in the host 
operating systems, as with SIMNET.  Moreover, some research has been conducted in the 
area of distributed computing security, which shares many characteristics with visual VEs 
such as a distributed model in which every host may contain some resource that must be 
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shared with other participants for the proper functioning of the system.  Particularly 
notable in this field are the efforts surrounding Grid computing, which will be discussed 
in section E.2.b of this Chapter. 
We now turn to an overview of areas of security research that are applicable to 
VEs.  It must be noted that this is not an exhaustive listing, but a representation of the 
subject domain.   
1. Information Assurance Overview 
As depicted in Table 2, IA encompasses the five areas: of secrecy, integrity, avail-
ability, non-repudiation, and authentication [NSTISSC00], [DOD96]. All five remain 
concerns throughout the life cycle of a VE.  Each one will be addressed to varying 
degrees through the security policy that is decided upon by the owner of a VE or its user.   
 
 
Table 2.   Areas of Information Assurance (IA). 
 
a. Integrity 
This area is concerned with preventing the unauthorized modification of 
data. Data can be maliciously modified in attempts to destroy the data, mislead users of 
the data, or, in the case of executable code, perform functions that were not intended by 
the original author. 
b. Confidentiality   
This area is concerned with preventing the unauthorized viewing of data.  
Data in memory or flowing in networks is available to be retrieved/intercepted and 
viewed.  Sensitive information must be protected from this possibility.  In some situations 
this may include information in IP packet headers that contain information on sending 
and destination IPs.  Through traffic analysis, attackers can determine a large amount of 
Area Description 
Integrity Prevent unauthorized modification of data 
Confidentiality Prevent unauthorized viewing of data 
Availability Ensure system/data is available for its intended use 
Non-repudiation Ensure a user cannot refute information they placed into the system 
Authentication Ensuring a user/module is who they say they are 
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information about a network, such as which nodes are more important than others, which 
ones are active at any one time, and the level of activity of the organization.     
c. Availability   
This area is concerned with ensuring the availability of a system and its 
data for the intended use.  If the system is disrupted by an outage, equipment failure, or 
disruptive denial of service attack then the system is no longer functional and provides no 
benefit. 
d. Non-repudiation   
Non-repudiation refers to the inability of an entity to deny having 
performed some action, or have provided some piece of information.  In the case of IA, 
this refers to being able to legally hold users accountable for information that they 
provide.  It also encompasses the inability of a recipient to deny having received a piece 
of information. 
  This area is concerned with preventing a user from providing 
information, and then later deny having done so.  This issue has special importance in 
systems that use provided information for sensitive operations, especially ones with legal 
ramifications, and accountability is an issue. 
e. Authentication   
This area is concerned with ensuring that an entity or component is 
actually who/what they identify themselves as.  This is the prime way of ensuring access 
only by authorized users.  There are three ways to authenticate:  through something that is 
possessed (e.g., smartcard), through something that is known (e.g., password), or through 
something that the entity is (e.g., biometrics) [Liu01]. 
When deciding upon a security policy and what mechanisms to implement, 
consideration of their impact on the QOS concerns previously mentioned must be taken 
into account. If, for example, encryption is decided upon for confidentiality of network 
communications, then consideration must be made to the fact that any form of encryption 
will induce some latency on the transmission of ESPDUs.   
2. Security Research Efforts 
There has been much security-related research performed, and a comprehensive 
listing and examination of them is outside the scope of this thesis. Therefore, an effort 
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has been made is to identify the good portion of the available research that is pertinent to 
the problem domain of VEs.  The following is merely an introduction to these efforts. 
a. On-line Game Industry Efforts 
An industry that relies greatly on VEs and has to deal with a myriad of 
security issues specific to their context is that of the on-line game industry.  Their issues 
with security revolve mostly around denial-of-service (DOS) attacks and a plethora of 
hackers/cheaters.  Their problem is an interesting one in that they need to balance the 
need to be available to anyone interested, but still protect the gaming experience of the 
honest players.  Various mechanisms have been employed by games such as UltimaTM 
and Age of EmpiresTM, but many are proprietary and protected from publication.  For 
more information concerning these efforts, refer to [Pritchard00].  
There is an area of the on-line-game industry that is akin to visual 
RTEVEs; that of Multi-User Dungeons (MUDs).  These are essentially text-based 
RTEVEs that have been in existence for over twenty years [Curtis94].  Other than being a 
form of VE, there similarity with RTEVEs rests in the characteristic of run-time 
extensibility, as new rooms, objects, characters, and behaviors can be added to the world 
without turning it off.  Some MUDS are provided rudimentary security through the need 
to register in order to have access to the MUD [Albert94].  
b. Grid Computing Technology 
[Foster01] defines the Grid problem as “…flexible, secure, coordinated 
resource sharing among dynamic collections of individuals, institutions, and 
resources…[what can be referred to as] ’virtual organizations’”.  The resource sharing 
that is referred to goes beyond the traditional idea of data transferring.  This concept 
actually refers to the ability of direct access to data, computing resources, and 
applications at remote systems/networks for the purpose of solving a problem.  This 
entails interconnecting and resource-brokering amongst many different entities, each of 
which will want control over just what is shared, with whom it is shared, and to what 
extent it is shared.  This creates numerous complex security concerns, such as 
authentications, authorization, and access control.  
Security efforts in Grid technology are ongoing.  This technology tends to 
incorporate other basic security technology into a comprehensive system for Grid 
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distributed computing.  These efforts have primarily focused on authentication, access 
control, integrity, and confidentiality.  Refer to [Foster98a], [Foster98b], and [Foster01] 
for more information and details on Grid computing and its associated security efforts.  
The distributed nature of the resource sharing technology in Grid 
computing has potential for being the base of an RTEVE infrastructure. Consequently the 
associated security mechanism would also have applicability.     
c. Symmetric and Asymmetric Encryption 
The two standard forms of encryption used to protect data both on a 
computer and over network communications.  Symmetric encryption deals with one key 
that both parties possess while asymmetric deals with two different but mathematically 
related keys (public and private) in which each key can be used to decipher data 
encrypted by the other.  Symmetric encryption is much faster than asymmetric, but 
requires an already secure infrastructure for key distribution.  Asymmetric encryption, on 
the other hand, is much slower than symmetric encryption, but distribution is much 
easier.  Refer to [Simmons79] for more detail. 
Public key infrastructure (PKI) is based on asymmetric encryption and is 
the predominant method of secure communication over the Internet. Refer to 
[Younglove01] for an overview of PKI. 
d. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)  
These systems are designed to identify malicious activity, preferably as it 
is occurring.  There are two forms of IDSs: signature-based and anomaly-based.  
Signature-based systems function by monitoring activity on a network, either real-time or 
through an audit log, and looking for a pattern that matches known intrusion signatures.  
Anomaly-based systems are designed to identify malicious activity, novel or known, by 
looking for departures from the known normal operating behavior of the system.  
Anomaly-based systems hold the greatest promise for complete coverage of intrusion 
detection, but the complexity of the problem domain is quite high and thus these systems 
are still not quite robust.  Please refer to [Forrest97], [Stillerman99], and [Vigna98] for 
examples on IDS research. 
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e. Access Control 
The need to constrain entities to only those resources which they are 
authorized to be exposed to is an important attribute for sensitive applications that 
involve collaboration between groups of varying security authorizations.  Access control 
mechanisms have been implemented that address this issue directly in the context of 
CVEs, VOs, and other non-visual VEs.  Please refer to [Bullock99] and [Pettifer01] for 
example implementations. 
f. Watermarking 
Interesting research in the area of 2-D image and 3-D model watermark 
technology has been performed. Please refer to [Benedens99] and [Berghel97].  This 
technology holds some promising possibilities for future data integrity applications 
within VEs; for instance: the possible development of code module watermarking 
techniques that could be used to identify authorship or ownership, or even to identify a 
modified code module. 
g. Object Signing 
A subset technology of PKI, it can be used to ‘sign’ objects in order to 
ensure their authentication after transfer through a network and can be used as a method 
for ensuring non-repudiation of those objects.  [Smith00] details an implementation of 
this technology for the BAMBOO system. 
h. Secure Multicast 
The use of multicast in a large-scale VE is almost a requirement.  A fair 
amount of research into secure multicast capabilities has been performed to address the 
concern of confidentiality.  Much of this research concentrates on the infrastructure 
needed for cryptographic key-distribution to all participants.  Please refer to [Molva00] 
and [Abdalla00]. 
i. Message Digests and Message Authentication Codes (MACs) 
Message digests and MACs are used for data integrity verification 
purposes. In the case of a data packet, a message digest is produced by running the 
packet’s contents through a hashing algorithm.  This algorithm produces a signature 
(digest) that is usually unique to the given data.  The digest is then sent with the data.  
The receiver of the packet then also runs the packet’s data contents through the same 
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engine, and produces another message digest.  If this new digest is different from that 
provided by the sender, then the data is deemed to have been modified and is not the 
authentic message.  This is usually only effective for non-malicious modifications.  An 
entity that desires to purposely modify a message would just need to generate a new 
message digest and replace both the digest and the message in the packet, and the 
message would be accepted.  
MACs are similar to message digests; however, the algorithm uses a 
symmetric cryptographic key for either encryption of a message digest, or for the 
computation of the digest itself.  Both the sender and receiver must possess the same key 
to develop the matching MACs; otherwise, authentication is impossible.  While this 
ensures message integrity, it does not ensure non-repudiation, since more than one entity 
has access to the key used to encrypt the message digest. For more detailed information 
please refer to [Stallings99] and [FIPS198]. 
The security of message digests can be considerably increased through the 
use of public-key encryption by encrypting the original message digest with a private 
key, thereby ‘signing’ the message digest.  A malicious entity would need to have 
possession of the sender’s private key in order to ‘sign’ a new message digest of the 
modified data. This adds the feature of non-repudiation in addition to maintaining 
integrity, and thus is sometimes called a ‘digital signature.’   
F. TECHNOLOGY USED FOR NPSNET SECURITY MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM (NSMS) 
1. Java Application Programming Interface (API) 
As stated earlier, NPSNET-V is programmed using the JAVA API developed by 
SUN Microsystems.  It is an object-oriented language that, when compiled, produces byte 
code that can be run on any machine-type that has the Java Virtual Machine installed.  
This cross-platform capability makes it desirable for large-scale distributed systems such 
as VEs.  For a more detailed discussion of Java refer to the Sun Microsystems Java 
website at http://java.sun.com, or [Flanagan99]. 
2. Java Security API 
The Java language provides many capabilities for use in protecting Java-based 
applications, as well as protecting host operating systems from java applications.  Since 
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the purpose of this work is to concentrate on application-to-application interactions, the 
security of the operating system from java applications is assumed to be adequate and 
therefore not implemented.   
This API, and several extensions to the API, also provides numerous mechanisms 
for information assurance efforts; including: a Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 
implementation, Public/private asymmetric and secret symmetric key generation using 
common key generation algorithms, and message digest and MAC engines.  The two 
extensions that were primarily used in this work are: the Java Secure Socket Extension 
(JSSE) and the Java Cryptography Extension (JCE).   
a. Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE) 
JSSE is an API used in the creation and implementation of Secure Socket 
Layer (SSL) sockets for encrypted reliable Transport Control Protocol (TCP) server-
client communications over the Internet.  Using PKI-based asymmetric public/private 
keys and certificates, the server and clients authenticate each other.  During the ensuing 
handshake, they agree upon a particular symmetric key to use for the remainder of the 
connection, thus allowing for speedier secure communications.   
In order to create SSL connections, each member of the connection must 
have a public/private key pair, and a certificate that contains the public key that is signed 
buy a certifying authority.  The Java Security API provides a tool called the ‘KEYTOOL’ 
that is used to create a ‘KeyStore’ and the public/private keys, and a ‘TrustStore’ that 
holds the certified certificates that are trusted by the owning application.  The 
‘KEYTOOL’ service is also used to generate the certificates that contain the public key.  
For more detailed information on the creation of these items and the associated keys, 
please refer to [Scott01].  
b. Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) 
The JCE is the API used for the creation and manipulation of 
cryptographic keys, both public/private asymmetric keys, and secret or symmetric keys.   
In particular, this API was used for the generation of symmetric keys used in ciphering 
features of the NSMS.  These keys are generated using one of many different algorithms 
that is provided to the key generator object and passed to the cipher engines.  
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The use of the Java Security API and its two Extensions were vital to the 
implementation   described in Chapter 4 of this work.  These APIs are robust and allow 
for inclusion of expanding security packages from outside security providers.  For more 
information refer to the Sun Java web pages at http://java.sun.com/security, and 
[Scott01]. 
3. Extensible Markup Language (XML) 
XML is not really a language, but a standard for creating languages that meet 
XML criteria.  XML is a hierarchical, extensible meta-data based markup language.  It is 
hierarchical in the sense that the data is structured in a parent-child, tree-style fashion.  It 
is extensible in the sense that the developer of an XML-based language can increase the 
type of different data that his language can function with.  In addition, it is meta-data 
based in the sense that every piece of data in the file must be ‘described’ by using a 
descriptive tag that is associated with the particular data item.  For more information on 
the details of XML, refer to [Hunter02]. 
As stated in earlier sections, NPSNET-V is a framework architecture on which an 
RTEVE is built.  XML-based configuration files provide the hierarchical blueprint 
needed for the proper initialization of a desired NPSNET-V world. 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an overview of VEs and RTEVEs, discussing their 
architecture and the QOS concerns that affect them; this discussion concluded with a 
breakdown of NPSNET-V into its five functional areas.  Security of VE was also 
introduced, along with a discussion of why it is an important area of research.  The five 
areas of Information assurance were presented, as well as brief discussion on several 
security-related research topics that are applicable to the security of VEs.  This section 
concluded with a brief overview of the technology that is pertinent to the development of 
the NSMS that will be presented in Chapter IV.   
The next chapter presents a taxonomy of RTEVE security areas, based on the 
research covered in this chapter.  It is followed by two matrices that can be used to better 
understand weaknesses in the identified areas, and possible mechanisms that can be used 
































III. TAXONOMY OF RTEVE SECURITY  
This chapter provides a thorough review of security issues within the realm of 
RTEVEs, using the NPSNET-V RTEVE discussed in the previous chapter as a case 
study.  It first presents security concerns with relation to the five areas of RTEVE 
functionality, and then to the five areas of IA.  Subsequently, it will present a taxonomy 
of RTEVE security areas through the form of a 5x5 matrix.  Two subsequent matrices 
will present scenarios that will clarify the areas, and mechanisms that can be used to 
address the identified areas.  It should be noted that these matrices are merely the 
beginning of a taxonomy for RTEVEs.  Further research may eventually reveal that this 
taxonomy should either be expanded or contracted. 
A. SECURITY DISCUSSION OF RTEVES 
This section will present two discussions on security concerns with respect to the 
functional component areas of NPSNET-V and the five areas of IA.  These discussions 
are not meant to be all inclusion and comprehensive, but merely a sample representation 
of the concerns in the indicated areas. 
1. Security Relative to the Five Functional Component Areas 
This section reiterates the five functional areas of RTEVEs, as based on the 
architecture of NPSNET-V, and introduces a brief introduction of security issues relevant 
to each one. 
a. Configuration Files 
The security of configuration files deals primarily with their 
modification/replacement or deletion.  Deletion of the file would prevent the ability to 
use the VE for its intended purpose.  Modification of configuration file could be 
performed to include a malicious module that is then loaded by the applications and 
executed.  Replacement of the file with another file affects the availability of the intended 
VE, or may introduce unwanted behavior into the system.    
b. Communications 
Security of communications revolves around the protection of the 
communication paths and the data that travels on these paths.  This includes the 
confidentiality, authentication, and integrity of the data in the network, as well as the 
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information that the traffic of the network can convey through analysis efforts.  Non-
repudiation plays a factor when accountability of what is communicated is of concern.    
c. Database 
Security of the database deals with the protection of the data stored within 
the database architecture of the system.  This includes all portions of the VE that require 
storage (e.g., Jar files, terrain data, streaming audio/video data). 
d. Components 
This section deals specifically with the security of the application kernel 
and the individual byte-code component modules that are used to build the VE 
applications.  Since these are executable modules, inclusion of malicious functionality 
would have far reaching consequences, especially if the size of the VE is extensive and 
all applications are downloading it; a virus could be spread almost instantaneously to 
potentially thousands of users.  Also, if a needed module has been deleted, the 
availability of the system would be degraded because the desired functionality is no 
longer present.   
e. Temporal 
A common, coordinated time-space is critical if the real-time 
synchronization of participant interaction is desired.  By manipulating the individual 
‘time-space’ of some participants and not others, a malicious entity can effectively 
destroy the temporal consistency of the VE, thus reducing or destroying its interactive 
capability.      
2. Security Relative to the Five Information Assurance Areas 
This section reiterates the five areas of IA, and provides a discussion on their 
relevance within RTEVEs. 
a. Integrity 
Integrity of the areas of an RTEVE is of primary concern.  If components 
and data of a system can be modified, then confidentiality and availability can easily be 
subverted by a knowledgeable hacker, either through direct manipulation, or the use of a 




Integrity of the XML configuration files is crucial for the proper operation 
of a VE.  Any unauthorized modification of its contents would alter the intended 
functionality of the VE, and possibly cause malicious code to be incorporated into the 
VE.  
The extensible nature of RTEVEs makes them vulnerable to maliciously 
modified modules. If a trojan horse were substituted for a legitimate component during 
transmission or in the database, all receiving applications would be subverted, resulting in 
undesired modified behavior.  
The integrity of ESPDUs and temporal information are also a concern.  By 
modifying the state information of participating entities, a malicious entity can ‘drive’ the 
information displayed on systems and provide misleading information.  The modification 
of temporal data can be used to reorder events, reducing the effectiveness and usability of 
the system. 
Another type of integrity attack is the so-called ‘replay attack’, in which 
the attacker records legitimate traffic, then at some later time resends exactly the same 
packets. Since the packets were at one time legitimate and were encrypted with a correct 
encryption key, the receiving system may mistakenly accept them, resulting in the ability 
of the attacker to repeat past behaviors in the VE. 
b. Confidentiality 
The possibility of RTEVEs being used in sensitive applications 
necessitates that confidentiality be a concern.  Within this context, secrecy of both 
computer and network systems must be taken into account.  This area has an impact in 
the integrity aspect as well.  For instance, if an adversary is able to acquire a copy of a 
module/file, they then can intelligently modify the component to include behavior that 
may be detrimental to the system. 
 In the case of military applications, there will be times when participants 
of varying classification levels will have need to coexist in the same virtual world, and 
thus have access to different information based on their clearance level.  Access control 
mechanisms come in to play in these situations.   
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Information can be gleaned by the analysis of traffic flowing across the 
network.  Depending on the purpose of the application and current state of affairs, an 
increase in data transmission can signal preparations for a military action or reveal 
relationships between units.  Even if the data is not readable, an attacker can determine 
what participants are most active or most informed and use that information to determine 
target vulnerabilities. 
c. Availability 
The availability of an RTEVE could be of great importance to an 
organization that is using the system for time-sensitive operations, such as battlefield 
information visualization.  The loss of use of a system such as could result in poor and 
deadly decision.  Loss of availability could be as a result of a distributed Denial of 
Service (DOS) attacks, such as packet saturation of the communication paths; intro-
duction of code designed to shut down one or more applications; or even attacks directed 
toward physical components of the RTEVE, such as data links or workstations. 
d. Non-repudiation 
In RTEVEs that are used for sensitive, critical information, the source of 
information that is injected into the system must be able to bear responsibility for that 
information. The ability to assign responsibility to a source can be used to identify 
possible malfunctioning equipment; but, more importantly, in can be used to identify 
deliberate misinformation. 
In the context of a battlefield visualization system, if a commander gives 
the order to launch missiles on what the system shows is a hostile aircraft, but in reality is 
a passenger jetliner, the source of the information must be traceable and must not be able 
to repudiate its introduction of the misinformation.   By being able to track down the 
cause of misinformation, vulnerabilities to the system can be identified, and those 
responsible can be held accountable.  
e. Authentication 
Methods such as IP hijacking or spoofing could be employed by a hacker 
to enter into the RTEVE and observe and interact with participants.  The possibility also 
exists that a malicious entity acquires a copy of the VE applications and attempts to join a 
VE in the hopes of passively viewing the contents of the VE.  Authentication of 
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component modules is also a significant issue; we may require authentication of 
components to assure that an attacker has not substituted a modified component while the 
component was transiting the network.  The nature of RTEVEs would require the need to 
authenticate users across a distributed computing environment; necessitating, for 
example, the incorporation of PKI into the architecture. 
B. RTEVE SECURITY TAXONOMY 
This section is divided into three sub-sections.  The first introduces a taxonomy of 
twenty-five RTEVE security areas developed through an analysis of NPSNET-V and IA 
security areas.  The second subsection contains example security attacks and scenarios 
used to give the reader insight into what types of issues can be associated with each one 
of the individual areas.  The final sub-section identifies various researched security 
mechanisms that can be applied to each of the twenty-five areas.       
1. RTEVE Security Areas 
This section introduces a taxonomy that was developed by combining the five 
functional component areas of the NPSNET-V RTEVE and the five IA areas.  Each of 
the five functional areas was considered as a target by each of the IA areas. This resulted 
in twenty-five different security areas that are presented in matrix form in Table 3, below.  




























Configuration files CFI CFAV CFC CFN CFAT
Components CMI CMAV CMC CMN CMAT
Database DBI DBAV DBC DBN DBAT
Communications CI CAV CC CN CAT
Temporal TI TAV TC TN TAT  
Table 3.   RTEVE Security Areas Matrix  
 
a. Configuration Files 
The Configuration Files grouping focuses on the configuration files that 
are used to delineate the basic structure and main components of a desired VE. 
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· CFI: Configuration File Integrity.  This area is concerned with 
protecting the configuration files from unauthorized modification; 
and, if they are modified, identifying that fact.  An attacker could 
modify the configuration file of a VE to have the applications load 
a ‘malicious’ module, or to cause the VE to function improperly.  
· CFAV: Configuration File Availability.  This area is concerned 
with ensuring that the configuration file is available for its intended 
use.  A configuration file is required for VE initialization; if the 
file is deleted or modified to prevent its use, then the user can’t use 
the system for the purpose for which it was intended.  
· CFC: Configuration File Confidentiality.  This area is 
concerned with protecting the configuration files from 
unauthorized viewing.  If a malicious entity is able to acquire a 
copy of the file, they then have the ability to intelligently create a 
malicious replacement file.  The contents of the configuration file 
might also give an attacker insight into what is being modeled; the 
existence of a certain type of aircraft entity in the configuration file 
could give the attacker an edge in predicting the nature of the 
simulation. 
· CFN: Configuration File Non-repudiation.  This area is 
concerned with ensuring that an authorized user that places a 
configuration file in the system has no way of denying that he did 
so.  If an authorized user intentionally changes a configuration file 
for some malicious purpose, there must be a capability that does 
not allow them the ability to deny having made the modification. 
· CFAT:  Configuration File Authentication.  This area is 
concerned with the process of authenticating the identity of a 
configuration file.  There must be a way to ensure that a 
configuration file in the system is indeed the correct file, and not a 
modified copy of the file.   
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b. Components 
The Components group focuses on the components that make up an 
individual RTEVE system; the main application kernel that each user must possess and 
the plethora of individual modules that are designed for each entity, behavior, and 
protocol. 
· CMI: Component Integrity.  This area is concerned with 
protecting the application kernel and modules from unauthorized 
modification; and, if they are modified, identifying that fact.  An 
attacker could modify an individual module in the system to 
contain a virus.  The virus is then easily spread throughout the 
system as applications assimilate the module. 
· CMAV: Component Availability.  This area is concerned with 
ensuring that the application and modules are available for their 
intended use. If the kernel or component is deleted, or otherwise 
modified to prevent its proper use, then the application is not able 
to function as intended and availability of the system is 
diminished. 
· CMC: Component Confidentiality.  This area is concerned with 
protecting the application kernel and modules from unauthorized 
viewing.  If a malicious entity is able to acquire a copy of the 
application or a module, they then have the ability to intelligently 
create a malicious replacement component. The contents of the 
component may also require secrecy.  The capabilities of a weapon 
might be deduced from the code that is intended to model its 
behavior. 
· CMN: Component Non-repudiation.  This area is concerned 
with ensuring that an authorized user that places a module in the 
system has no way of denying that he did so.  If an authorized user 
intentionally places a module into the system that contains 
malicious code, there must be mechanisms to ensure they cannot 
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refute that action.  Conversely if a malicious entity modifies an 
authorized module to contain malicious code, the same 
mechanisms should be able to prove the original authorized user 
was not responsible. 
· CMAT: Component Authentication.  This area is concerned with 
the process of authenticating the identity of a component, ensuring 
that it is the correct component.  Good CMAT practices will assist 
against attacks that fall in the CMI and CMAV areas.  
c. Database 
The database grouping focuses on the database structure of a given VE.  A 
database could be central or distributed; it could contain modules of code or binary data 
for terrain, or anything that could be needed within a VE.   
· DBI: Database Integrity.  This area is concerned with 
protecting the information within the database from unauthorized 
modification; and, if anything is modified, identifying that fact.  If 
an attacker were able to access and modify the database, they 
potentially can affect every application that uses its data. Equally 
as damaging would be a virus was able to that access the database 
and writes itself into every component within the database; when a 
VE is initialized and the components are transmitted to all users, 
the virus would massively propagated. 
· DBAV: Database Availability.  This area is concerned with 
ensuring that the information in the database is available for its 
intended use.  RTEVEs require the ability to access configuration 
files, unknown modules, and other data for proper functioning.  If 
these are not available for use, then the applications are useless. 
· DBC: Database Confidentiality.  This area is concerned with 
protecting the information in the database from unauthorized 
viewing.  Some databases may contain classified information, 
which requires protection.  Also, if modules within the database 
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are acquired, they can be used to design malicious modules that 
can pass for the modules within the database. 
· DBN: Database Non-repudiation.  This area is concerned with 
ensuring that an authorized user that places data in the database 
cannot deny that action.  In order to hold someone accountable for 
any harm that is caused by something placed in the database, there 
must be accountability mechanisms.  
· DBAT: Database Authentication.  This area is concerned with the 
process of authenticating the identity of a database.  If a malicious 
entity were to create a database that mimicked the real database, 
and contained accurate modules with malicious code, or no code at 
all, then the VE would be subject to attacks in the DBAV or DBI 
areas.  
d. Communications 
The Communications grouping focuses on the communications paths of 
the system and the data that rides on those paths.  
· CI: Communications Integrity.  This area is concerned with 
protecting the data passing on the communications paths from 
unauthorized modification; and, if they are modified, identifying 
that fact.  An attacker could modify the data packets of a particular 
entity to misrepresent that entity’s state in other users’ 
applications, making the entity appear in a different position or 
perform different tasks. 
· CAV: Communications Availability.  This area is concerned with 
ensuring that the data on the communications paths is available for 
its intended use, and the communications paths themselves are 
fully functional and available for their intended use.  If a an 
attacker is able to disrupt a communications link, or flood the 
communications with useless packets, then the application will be 
unable to be used for its intended purpose.  
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· CC: Communications Confidentiality.  This area is concerned 
with protecting the data on the communications paths from 
unauthorized viewing.  A party that is interested in gathering 
intelligence on what is occurring within the VE, but not disrupting 
it, may attempt to intercept the data as it is traveling on the 
communications paths and reconstruct what is occurring. 
· CN: Communications Non-repudiation.  This area is concerned 
with ensuring that an authorized user that places data into the 
communications channels has cannot deny that he did so.  If an 
authorized user places false information into a VE system, which 
results in adverse consequences, there is no way to hold them 
accountable unless a non-repudiation mechanism is in place. 
· CAT:  Communications Authentication.  This area is concerned 
with the process of authenticating the identity of the data on the 
communications path.  The ability of ensuring that every piece of 
data received off the communications paths is from an authorized 
user is an important attribute for addressing the CCI and CCAV 
areas.  
e. Temporal 
The temporal group focuses on the time synchronization system required 
to ensure that all participants in the VE are functioning with coordinated clocks.  This 
function is generally provided to the Internet through the NTP (Network Time Protocol) 
system; individual network/system can routinely update their internal clock to match true 
atomic clock time received through this system.  A dedicated time-server could also be 
used to provide a common time-space for synchronized interactions. 
· TI: Temporal Integrity.  This area is concerned with protecting 
the temporal data that synchronizes all entities with a VE.  If an 
attacker individually modifies the temporal information sent to 
each participant, then they would be functioning in different time 
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spaces within the same VE, destroying the usability for 
coordinated interaction. 
· TAV: Temporal Availability.  This area is concerned with 
ensuring the availability of VE-wide time synchronization data.  If 
the synchronization data from the time servers is blocked from 
reaching the VE users, then each user’s machine error will 
eventually cause disparity amongst all users as their workstation’s 
clocks begin to drift at varying rates.    
· TC: Temporal Confidentiality.  This area is concerned with 
protecting the temporal data from unauthorized viewing.  If a 
malicious entity were able to intercept the temporal 
synchronization to the user applications, they could develop more 
intelligent temporal attacks such as intercepting and modifying the 
synchronization data to specific users in an attempt to disrupt only 
their data or system in a manner that makes temporal sense, but 
that is not accurate.  
· TN: Temporal Non-repudiation.  This area is concerned with 
ensuring that the temporal data can be accurately traced back to its 
originating time-server.  An authorized time-server should not be 
able to refute the synchronization data that it has provided.  Also, if 
synchronization data was altered by a rogue time-server, the same 
mechanisms should be able to exonerate the authorized time-
servers and indicate such. 
· TAT: Temporal Authentication.  This area is concerned with 
the process of authenticating the temporal data from the time-
server.  There should be a way to ensure that the synchronization 
data is from an authorized time-server.  Good TAT practices will 




2. Security Scenarios 
This section presents a matrix, Table 4, that identifies possible attacks and 
scenarios that would provide some understanding to the types of concerns that fall within 
each of the twenty-five RTEVE security areas.  For each attack and scenario, the security 
areas that are, or can be, affected contain the identifying number (Arabic or Roman, e.g., 
3,i) of the corresponding example.  Please note that this is not meant to be an all-



























Configuration files 1,9,ii 7,9,10,ii 11,14,ii  4 1,14,ii
Components 2,8,iii 7,8,10,iv 11,14,iii 4 2,19,14,ii,iii
Database 2,7,iii 7,10,iv 12,14,v,viii 4 1,2,14,ii,iii
Communications 3,4,vi,x 6,ix 13,15,i,vi 4 3,4,14,17,18,vi
Temporal 5,i,ix 5,vii x 4 5,ix  
Table 4.   RTEVE Security Scenario Matrix  
 
a. Simple Attacks 
This category contains simple known attacks and examples that are used 
to identify the RTEVE security areas that are affected by the attack.  Each attack is 
identified by a number, and that number is placed in the matrix presented in Table 4. 
 [1]  A malicious entity modifies the XML configuration file in the 
database to download a malicious module.  
 [2]  An entity modifies an application or module located in the 
database to include malicious code. 
 [3]  An entity that has performed an IP hijack or has subverted a 
router modifies ESPDUs in order to mislead the recipients of the packets, or 
replaces modules enroute with malicious code such as a virus. 
 [4]  An entity uses the IP of an authorized user to inject fake 
packets that create confusion in the VE. 
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 [5]  A malicious entity manipulates the timing information that is 
used for synchronization in order to disrupt the VE and have events occur out of 
sequence. 
 [6]  A traditional DOS attack is performed by flooding the target 
computers/networks with useless packets, thereby slowing down or halting the 
simulation. 
 [7]  The system database is destroyed, thereby removing all ability 
to locate needed modules/data. 
 [8]  Modules are modified so that their behavior is incorrect 
 [9]  Configuration files are corrupted thereby denying the ability to 
correctly configure a desired VE 
 [10]  A worm/virus modifies/destroys needed files/modules/data. 
 [11]  A malicious entity surreptitiously acquires a copy of the 
application or a module to develop malicious copies for future use. 
 [12]  A malicious entity retrieves the password file for the VE 
system.  Then uses a cracking program to break the hashes. 
 [13]  An entity uses a packet-sniffer to acquire unencrypted 
network traffic containing ESPDUs and administrative messages of the system; 
allowing them to see what the system is being used for.    
 [14]  A rogue, authorized user attains system information that is 
beyond their clearance level.  
 [15]  A malicious entity uses a packet sniffer to perform traffic 
analysis on VE network traffic in an attempt to identify what participants are most 
active and target them for further action, or to determine the general level of 
simulation activity, which could signal that some operation may be occurring 
soon. 
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 [16]  An authorized user knowingly places false information into 
the VE, or modifies a configuration files, application, or component for malicious 
reasons. 
 [17]  Man in the Middle.  A malicious entity inserts itself between 
the system and a user, in a manner where the user thinks the entity is the system, 
and the system thinks he is the user. 
 [18]  IP spoofing.  A malicious entity uses the IP address of an 
authorized user to send packets into the system so that it appears the information 
is from that known user. 
 [19]  A malicious user possesses a copy of the core application and 
is able to get accepted as an authorized participant 
b. Scenarios 
This category contains simple attack scenarios that may  be performed on 
an RTEVE system.  The areas of attack that are covered by these scenarios are identified 
in the matrix by the scenario’s Roman numeral.  
[i]  A malicious entity establishes a time-server and manages to 
have it replace the real time server for a particular VE.  He then analyzes the 
generated traffic on the communications channels and identifies which ‘users’ are 
producing the most updates.  He then manipulates the time information being sent 
to those identified systems, causing their synchronization to change relative to the 
entire VE; this causes the entities of the VE to no longer share the same time-
space.  Users may or may not be able to identify the miss-synchronization, and 
poor decision can arise. Additionally, the mismatch may cause a host to reject 
time-stamped packets for being too old. 
[ii]  An entity acquires a copy of a configuration file, and modifies 
it so that an applications requires a module containing malicious code that resides 
on a database created by the attacker.  He then manages to replace the original 
configuration file with the modified, malicious copy.  The configuration file is 
retrieved by other users and the malicious module is downloaded.  The module 
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turns out to be a trojan horse that contains code that, at a specific time, will cause 
the system to shut down, thus terminating the VE. 
[iii]  Having detailed knowledge of specific module used by a VE, 
a malicious entity develops a virus that will search for that particular module in a 
database and modify it to contain code that will retransmit every ESPDU received 
by the host application to a system set-up by the attacker.  The attacker then finds 
some way for the virus to be placed on the system (i.e., e-mail, an unwitting 
authorized user installs free software, etc.).  The virus is executed and the module 
is modified directly within the database.  A VE is then initiated that requires that 
module, and now every instantiation of the module is transmitting ESPDUs back 
to the malicious entity.  The entity now sits back and watches what is happening.   
[iv]  A system that contains the database of modules for a specific 
VE, is infected with a worm that destroys all data on the system.  The entire 
database is destroyed, and there are no other copies. 
[v]  A virus somehow is placed on a system that contains a 
classified terrain data server for VE systems.  When the virus is executed, it is 
able to read the data from the server and transmits it back to the virus’ creator.  
[vi]  A malicious entity subverts a number of key routers in the 
network and monitors the traffic, looking for a particular entity’s ESPDUs.  When 
he sees one, he modifies the data in the ESPDU in an effort to manipulate the VE 
to his own ends, and transmits the modified packet.  All receivers of that packet 
now have an incorrect state for that entity.   
[vii]  An entity removes the time-server for a system, causing the 
systems to rely on their own internal clocks.  Over time, the time difference 
between machines grows to a point where coordination is difficult, if not 
impossible within the VE, and the VE loses its ability to be used. 
[viii]  In a research and development world, a corporate cyber-spy 
infiltrates the database of a weapons manufacturer that uses a VE to develop the 
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weapon in a collaborative environment.  He hunts down the information that 
describes the behavior and performance of the system, then quietly disappears.  
[ix]  A VE is being used as a battlefield visualization system 
during a military campaign.  The adversary in the campaign identifies the 
communication paths of the system and manages to disable the necessary routers, 
thereby denying the use of the system to the field commander.  
[x]  An American commander uses a battle-field visualization 
system as an early warning system for incoming missiles.  The enemy launches a 
missile and desires to mislead the US forces in order to enhance the chances of 
success.  The enemy manages to subvert the workstation of the system that is 
tracking the missile and placing ESPDUs into the VE system.  The enemy also 
can see the synchronization stamp provided by the time-servers.  By manipulating 
the time stamp of the outgoing packets that contain the information on their 
missile, they cause the commander to believe that the missile is slower than it 
really is.  The commander is then surprised/confused when the missile enters the 
close-in detection system possibly leading to confusion/uncertainty.  Even if the 
missile is successfully defended against, the commander subsequently loses 
confidence in the information provided by the system. 
3. Security Measures 
This section presents a matrix, Table 5, which identifies a sample of available 
security mechanisms and technology that can be applied to each of the areas.  This listing 

























Configuration files c,d,e f a,c,d c c
Components c,d,e f a,c,d c c
Database c,d,e f a,c,d c c
Communications c,d,e b,f a,d c c
Temporal c,e f a c c  
Table 5.   RTEVE Security Measures Matrix  
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a. Encryption  
Encryption techniques fall within the two different key structures 
explained in Chapter II, section E.2.c.  Please refer to that section for details on 
symmetric & asymmetric encryption. 
Networks can be encrypted in various methods.  Two of the most common 
are end-to-end and link encryption.  In end-to-end, the encryption and decryption of the 
data occurs at the individual workstations themselves, and therefore the packet headers 
on the network are still subject to observation and traffic analysis can be performed.   
Link encryption, on the other hand, occurs at the nodes of the network, where each node-
node connection is encrypted.  In link encryption, all data, including the packet headers, 
is encrypted, making traffic analysis much more difficult.  
b. Intrusion Detection 
This covers the ability to detect malicious behavior within the network and 
workstations.  Refer to Chapter II, section E.2.d for details. 
c. Identification and Authentication (I&A) 
Identification and authentication is the process of authenticating a user or 
object.  The authentication process is normally accomplished with something the 
user/object ‘is’, ‘knows’, or ‘possesses’.  An example of something a user/object ‘is’ 
would be biometric information, such as fingerprints, or hashing signatures.  An example 
of something a user/object ‘knows’ would be a password.  An example of something a 
user/object ‘possesses’ would be a token of some sort, such as a ‘smartcard’ or badge.    
d. Access Control Methods 
Access control deals with ensuring users are confined to those areas for 
which they have access.  Refer to Chapter II, section E.2.e for details. 
e. Modification Detection 
Modification detection uses Hashing algorithms to develop signatures for 
data, which can then be used to identify modifications.  Message digests and MACs are 
examples of this mechanism. Refer to Chapter II, section E.2.h for details. 
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f.  Availability Assurance 
This area encompasses the methods of protecting the availability of 
resources from issues such as single point of failure vulnerabilities.  Methods include 
replication of resources, so that if one copy becomes unusable, other copies are still 
available; distributing database resources are prime examples.  
Important, sensitive systems must also guard for physical availability. 
Ensuring redundant power supplies are available in the event of primary power loss can 
ensure that the protected system will always be ready for its purpose.   
C. SUMMARY 
 This chapter presented a matrix of twenty-five RTEVE security areas.  
These areas were created by pairing up the 5 information assurance areas with each of the 
five functional areas of an RTEVE as represented by the NPSNET-V framework.  For 
clarity, a second matrix was developed that associates various security scenarios with the 
respective security areas in the matrix.  And, finally, a third matrix was developed to 
associate developed mechanisms with the security areas that they can be used to address. 
  The next chapter will provide the details on the design and implementation of 
the security capability that was developed to address several security areas of NPSNET-
V.         
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IV. NPSNET-V SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (NSMS) 
This chapter contains the design and implementation details of the basis of a 
security management system for NPSNET-V.  Our design and implementation is not 
complete, but it was sufficient for prototyping three NSMS security-enabling filters.   
A. REQUIREMENTS OF AN RTEVE SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
Ideally, a security management system will provide complete coverage of the 
twenty-five areas of RTEVE security as identified in chapter III.  Its predominant 
characteristics should include the following:   
· Must be distributed to prevent single-point-of-failure weakness and also 
for the ability to scale limitlessly.  It should be comprised of a 
combination of host-based, application-based, and middleware, 
networked-based security functionality. 
· Must maintain a robust and efficient key distribution system for all 
participants.  This system must be able to perform and manage routine key 
distribution to all participants, to include when a new communication 
channel is opened that needs to use a key, as well as timely coordinated 
routine key changes.  It must also be able to handle emergency key 
distribution for when a compromise is detected.   
· Ability to identify malicious behavior and provide a response to it.  It must 
possess a robust intrusion detection and response capability; preferably an 
anomaly-based detection system for identification of unknown and novel 
attacks and intrusions.  The response capability must be able to isolate the 
intruder from the system, permanently, or even allow for the possibility of 
decoy mechanisms that can be used to fool intruders while information 
about them is being gathered for potential use [Michael02]. 
· Must allow for I&A, integrity checks, and a non-repudiation capability of 
every possible entity or object that can access resources, resources that can 
be accessed, or objects that are passed.  This includes users, configuration 
files, applications, modules, and data packets. 
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· Should allow for the simultaneous presence of participants with differing 
security levels and compartment authorizations through the use of access 
control mechanisms. 
Some of these capabilities may be sacrificed if there is no need for them in a 
specific application. As with any software project, features are driven by requirements. 
B. SCOPE OF NSMS 
This section will cover the scope of the NSMS including the assumptions made 
and the capabilities that were targeted.  But, first will be a quick overview of the RTEVE 
security areas that are addressed to some extent by this design.  





























Configuration files CFI CFAV CFC CFN CFAT
Components CMI CMAV CMC CMN CMAT
Database DBI DBAV DBC DBN DBAT
Communications CI CAV CC CN CAT
Temporal TI TAV TC TN TAT  
Table 6.   RTEVE Security Areas Addressed by NSMS 
 
 This implementation of the NSMS addresses, to some degree, each of the 
identified areas in Table 6.  Note that this implementation focuses on ESPDU 
transmissions, which form only one of several communications between applications and 
servers.  CMAT is addressed through the use of certificates and a PKI to authenticate one 
type of component, the StandardSecurityManager, while leaving unaddressed other types 
of components. CI is addressed through the use of a message digest provided with each 
packet for integrity verification.  CC is addressed through encrypting data packets.  CAT 
is addressed through the indirect fact that only authenticated applications possess correct 
keys for encryptions, and if an ESPDU was encrypted with the correct key, then the 




2. Assumptions  
The main assumptions for the areas covered by the NSMS are as follows: 
· An adequate computer IA policy is in place, including I&A and access 
control mechanisms for and within computer and network resources. 
· Authorized users of a workstation are also authorized users of the 
NPSNET-V framework and any worlds created with it. 
· Certificates used for SSL authentication are unable to be maliciously 
acquired.    
· Existence of a synchronized, uncompromised time space.   
3. Capabilities 
The NSMS addresses the four areas identified in Table 6 through a number of 
mechanisms performed through two separate, yet communicating software entities: A 
security-focused server and a security-based component system embedded within 
NPSNET-V applications.  The component-based system is further broken down into two 
types of objects: a StandardSecurityManager object and Filter Objects, of which there are 
three. The mechanisms in these objects focus on packet communications of the NPSNET-
V framework.   
The server’s capabilities are: 
· StandardSecurityManager component authentication through the use of 
certificates, and managing SSL connections. 
· Generation of symmetric keys for use in packet encryption functions. 
· Ability to generate keys using three different key generation algorithms: 
Data Encryption Standard (DES), Multiple DES (DESede), and Blowfish. 
[Stallings98] and [Oaks01].  Also, the use of varying key lengths (56 – 
448 bits) when using the Blowfish algorithm.   
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· Management of all applications and associated registered encryption-
capable filters and their keys that successfully authenticate and connect to 
the server. 
· Capability of setting an ‘Active period’ in which the key is to be used, 
which will allow for coordinated key changes based on time.  
  The StandardSecurityManager capabilities include: 
· Management of filter Objects 
· Management of symmetric keys that are received from the security server.  
To include proper routing of a key to the intended encryption mechanism, 
the proper management of keys provided for future use, and the effective 
change of keys when a new key’s active period begins. 
The various filters’ capabilities include the following: 
· Symmetric key management, and enciphering and deciphering operations 
on packets. 
· Management of sequencing numbers within outbound and inbound data 
packets.  
· Management of data integrity verification operations on data packets 
through the use of message digests. 
C. DESIGN OVERVIEW 
1. Technology Used 
As discussed in Chapter II, section F, the technology used in the research reported 
here utilizes the Java API and the Java Security API.  The majority of the security 
functionality was created using the two extensions to the Java Security API: the JSSE for 
SSL capabilities, and the JCE for cryptographic capabilities.  And finally, XML was used 
in the process of developing several configuration files for use in the testing and 
experimentation of the NSMS.     
2. Patterns Used 
“Software patterns are reusable solutions to recurring problems that occur during 
software development.” [Grand98]  NPSNET-V makes use of various well-known 
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programming patterns.  The following three patterns were widely used within the design 
of the NSMS.  Refer to [Grand98] for greater details. 
a. Filter 
“The filter pattern allows objects that perform different transformations 
and computations on streams of data and that have compatible interfaces to dynamically 
connect in order to perform arbitrary operations on streams of data.” [Grand98]   This 
pattern allows a programmer to develop a number of different objects that manipulate a 
stream of data in different ways.  The programmer can then connect these filter objects, 
varying the sequence that they are connected, in order to produce the desired sequence of 
manipulations on the initial data.   
This pattern was used in developing the filters that perform operations on 
the ESPDUs.   Further detail will be provided later in this chapter. 
b. Interface 
The idea behind interfaces is to “…Keep a class that uses data and 
services provided by instances of other classes independent of those classes by having it 
access those instances through an interface.” [Grand98]  This pattern allows for a plug-
and-play type of architecture within an application.  For example, a certain application 
relies on a specific service to be provided, and that service can be provided by different 
service providers.  All that the application interface needs to specify is a set of functions 
that any ServiceProvider must implement in order to provide the desired service.  Any 
ServiceProvider that is to be used with the application must implement the functions 
required by the interface in order for the applications to be able to use its services.  
Interfaces are used widely throughout NPSNET-V.  They are the primary 
means used by most components to couple with each other.  An interface permits an 
object to communicate with another object, without knowing how the other object 
provides the desired service or the implementation class.  As long as the requesting object 
passes the arguments expected by the interface of the other object, the request can be 
acted on by the service.  
c. Listener  
More commonly known as the ‘Observer’, this pattern lays the foundation 
for efficient notification of events occurring in one object to be transmitted to interested 
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objects that register themselves with that first object.  In the NSMS this pattern is also 
widely used in communications between the objects contained in the NPSNET-V 
framework.     
3. Three Main Components 
The NSMS is comprised of three major components:  A SecureServer system, a 
SecurityManager type object and filter objects.  The relationship of these objects is 
depicted in Figure 3 below.  The SecurityManager is an interface that supplies required 
methods for objects built on that interface.  For this work, the StandardSecurityManager 
object, that implements the SecurityManager interface.  All extended NPSNET classes 
and implemented interfaces that are referenced in this section are described in detail in 
section C.4 of this chapter.  
-I & A of participants
-Key generation & time period 
management
























Figure 3.   NSMS Main Component Objects and Their Capabilities 
 
a. SecureServer 
The SecureServer is an object that extends Module, allowing it to be a 
module within an NPSNET-V application.  It also implements two Interfaces: Runnable 
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and Startable.  Runnable is used to spawn off the server’s listening process as a separate 
thread, and Startable is used by the NPSNET framework to start and stop the thread.     
Several Objects were designed for use with the SecureServer in providing 
its functionality.  It Contains a KeyMaker object, which is used for the production of 
SecretKeyPacks.  It also contains any number of SecureServerConnection objects, each 
of which represents a communications link to an individual StandardSecurityManager 
object.  Descriptions of these objects can be found in section C.4 of this chapter. 
The server’s functionality can be broken down into three areas; these are:  
management of connected StandardSecurityManagers, management of symmetric key 
generation, and distribution to registered SecureFilters.   
b. StandardSecurityManager 
The StandardSecurityManager is an object that extends Module, allowing 
it to be a module within an NPSNET-V application, and implements the 
SecurityManager interface.  This interface allows any object that implements the 
SecurityManagerSubscriber to create a communication link with the implementing 
object.  This allows for the connectivity with the filters described in the next section.   
The functionality of this object can be broken down into three areas:  
communications with the SecureServer, management of registered filters, and 
management of the distribution of received SecretKeyPacks destined for SecureFilters.     
c. Filters 
Filter objects allow for the manipulation of data streams.  These filters 
follow the filter pattern as described in section C.2 of this chapter.  Each of the filters 
extends ModuleContainer, and implements the Channel, ReceivedPacketListener, 
PropertyBearerListener, and SecurityManagerSubscriber interfaces.    
Filters perform operations on NPSNET-V DataPacket objects that pass 
through them.  Each filter removes a byte array, representing the data, from the packet.  
The appropriate manipulation is performed on the byte array, and then a new DataPacket 
is generated with the new manipulated byte array, and sent along the communication 
stream.   
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The NSMS has three filter objects, each with unique functionality in 
manipulating the data contained within the DataPackets.  These filters are: the 
SequenceFilter, the IntegrityFilter, and the SecureFilter.  Section E of this chapter 
provides an in-depth overview of these objects.   
4. Miscellaneous Components 
The main components identified in the previous section require the use of several 
other objects.  Some of these objects are basic to the NPSNET-V architecture, and allow 
the NSMS to function within it.  Others were created to provide and assist with the 
functionality of the system.  These are described in the below sections. 
a. NPSNET-V Classes 
Three NPSNET defined classes are used within the NSMS:  Module, 
ModuleContainer, and DataPacket.  Module is an abstract class that represents the base 
class of every NPSNET-V module.  ModuleContainer is a class that allows for the 
containment of other Modules and ModuleContainers.  An easy way to visualize this is to 
think of Module as only being able to be leaf nodes of a tree, and ModuleContainers as 
having the ability to be any kind of node in the tree. 
The DataPacket object contains the entity state data to be transmitted 
across the network.  It holds two primary data elements: an array of bytes representing 
the data, and an integer holding the length of the array.  
b. Interfaces 
Since interfaces are the primary means of communications between 
components within NPSNET-V, they play an important role in the NSMS.  Two 
interfaces were designed to support the communication between the 
StandardSecurityManager and the filters.   
SecurityManager:  Implemented by the StandardSecurityManager, this 
interface was designed as a means for the filters to establish a connection with the 





Returns Method Name (parameters) Description 
void addSecureSubscriber 
(SecurityManagerSubscriber sms) 
Registers a filter with the SecurityManager 
void removeSecureSubscriber     
(SecurityManagerSubscriber sms) 
Unregisters a filter with the SecurityManager 
Table 7.   SecurityManager Interface Methods 
 
SecurityManagerSubscriber: Implemented by the filters, this interface was 
designed as a means for the StandardSecurityManager to communicate with the 
filters.  Table 8 provides a listing of the methods required by this interface. 
 
Returns Method Name (parameters) Description 
void beginPacketTransmission() Signals filter to transmit packets 
void endPacketTRansmission() Signals filter to stop transmitting packets 
void beginPacketReception() Signals filter to receive packets 
void endPacketReception() Signals filter to stop receiving packets 
void addKeyPack(SecretKeyPack skp) Provides filter with a new SecretKeyPack 
void setApplicationID(long id) Provides filter with the host applications ID 
String getID Returns the filter’s ID 
SecretKeyPack getCurrentKeyPack() Returns the current SecretKeyPack in use, if any 
Vector getAllKeyPacks() Returns all SecretKeyPacks that are waiting to 
begin their active period 
int getFilterType Returns the filter’s type  
(i.e. Secure, Integrity, Sequence) 
Table 8.   SecurityManagerSubscriber Interface Methods 
 
These two interfaces provide the ability to create different types of 
SecurityManager and SecurityManagerSubscriber objects; they can be easily integrated 
as long as they contain the methods identified in the interfaces.   This provides the ability 
to have several different types of SecurityManager type objects from which to choose 
depending on the security functionality that is desired.  
The two interfaces that were developed as part of the NSMS were 
discussed above, but there are many other interfaces specific to NPSNET-V that were 
required to be implemented by NSMS objects.  A brief description of each is presented:   
Channel:  This interface is used to identify objects used as entity state 
packet handlers and manipulators.  It requires three methods be implemented:  
sendPacket, addReceivedPacketListener, removeReceivedPacketListener; the first 
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one is used for transmitting packets outbound; the last two are used for connecting 
the implementing object to connect to the next higher object in the application.   
PropertyBearerListener:  This interface is used for establishing channel-
to-channel outbound communications.  That is entity state packets from an 
application’s entities are communicated down and out of the application through 
communication links established through this interface. It requires two methods 
be implemented:  propertybearerRegistered and propertyBearerDeregistered.  
These are used to register and deregister objects that are interested in changes in 
the object with which they are registered.   
ReceivedPacketListener: This interface is used for establishing channel-to-
channel inbound communication.  That is received packets from the network are 
communicated up the application through communication links established 
through this interface.  It requires one method be implemented: packetReceived.  
This allows implementing objects to transmit received packets up the application 
to.  
Startable:  This interface is used for module control.  It requires three 
methods be implemented:  start, stop, isRunning; the first two are self describing, 
the third returns a Boolean indicating if the module is running.   
A number of Java API interfaces were used as well.  These include: 
Runnable and Serializable.  Refer to [Flanagan99] for descriptions of these 
interfaces. 
c. SecretKeyPack  
The SecretKeyPack is a data-holding object that was created in order to 
facilitate the management and distribution of symmetric keys within the NSMS.  It 
contains all the information needed by a SecureFilter for the proper operation of 






Data Item Type Description 
filterID String The SecureFilter that this key is intended for 
keyID array of  four bytes The SecretKeyPack’s identifier in byte form 
keyIDInt integer The SecretKeyPack’s identifier integer form 
key Key The symmetric key object 
initializationVector Array of eight bytes The initialization vector required for chaining 
mode String The chaining mode to be used with the key 
paddingScheme String The padding scheme to be used with the key 
beginTime long The start time of the key’s active period 
endTime long  The end time of the key’s active period 
Table 9.   SecretKeyPack Data Items 
 
 
d. SecureServerConnection  
A SecureServerConnection object represent an SSL connection between 
the SecureServer and an individual StandardSecurityMananger.  It is created by the 
SecureServer whenever a StandardSecurityManager successfully connects, receiving a 
handle to the SSL socket that was generated, an identifying integer value unique to that 
connection, and a handle back to the SecureServer to ensure two-way communications.   
Table 10 identifies the public methods of the SecureServerConnection object. 
 
Returns Method Name (parameters) Description 
Void Run() Threaded method that listens for communications 
from the StandardSecurityManager 
Vector getFilterVector Returns a Vector containing the Filters associated 
with this connection 
Void sendKeyPack 
(SecretKeyPack keyPack) 
Transmits the given SecretKeyPack to the 
StandardSecurityMananger associated with this 
connection. 
Void closeConnection() Closes the connection’s socket 
Table 10.   Methods of the SecureServerConnection object 
 
e. KeyMaker  
The KeyMaker object is instantiated by the SecureServer, and is used for 
symmetric key generation.  It contains a KeyGenerator object that produces symmetric 
keys based on the algorithm that it is initialized with; currently three algorithms can be 
used: DES, DESede, and Blowfish.   
The KeyMaker can be instantiated in three way.  The default setting will 
initialize the KeyGenerator with the DES algorithm and identify the chaining mode and 
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PKCS5Padding (see [Oaks 01] and [Stallings99] for information on chaining and padding) 
as the relevant parameters to set within the SecretKeyPack for use by the ciphers engines 
in the SecureFilters.  The second way is by passing the key algorithm to the constructor; 
this will create a KeyGenerator with the passed algorithm, the remaining default settings 
will be applied to the SecretKeyPack.  The third way is by passing the desired key 
algorithm, chaining mode, and padding scheme to the KeyMaker, overriding all the 
defaults.  This functionality is provided for future use, currently only one chaining 
scheme is operable, as well as one padding scheme; these are currently set as the default 
as identified earlier. 
A feature implemented in the KeyMaker is the ability to generate key with 
random key algorithm.  When a flag is set by a call to the randomAlgorthmOn method, 
every successive key will be generated with a random algorithm (DES, DESede, 
Blowfish).  This ability can be shut off by a call to the randomAlgorithmOff method.  
This capability is primarily of use only for testing purposes. 
The public methods for the KeyMaker object are identified in Table 11.  
These methods provide for the required functionality of producing SecretKeyPacks for 
use with the SecureFilters.  
 
Returns Method Name (parameters) Description 
void changeKeyAlgorithm(String alg) Initializes KeyGenerator with the new 
algorithm 
void changeCipherMode(String mod) Changes the desired chaining mode to use 
with the key 
void changePaddingScheme(String mod) Changes the desired padding scheme to use 
with the key 
String getKeyAlgorithm() Returns the KeyGenerator’s current 
algorithm 
String getCipherMode() Returns the current desired chaining mode 
String getPaddingScheme() Returns the current desired padding scheme 
SecretKeyPack generateKeyPack 
(int keyID, long bTime, long eTime ) 
Returns a new SecretKeyPack with the 
passed KeyID, beginTime and endTime. 
Void randomAlgorithmON() Sets the random key algorithm flag to true 
Void randomAlgorithmOff() Sets the random key algorithm flag to false 






f. KeyStores & Certificates 
A KeyStore is used to hold asymmetric private and public keys, and the 
associated certificate.  A TrustStore contains trusted certificates that are used to validate 
the authenticity of presented certificates.   In order to allow for the proper functioning of 
SSL sockets, both the SecureServer and the StandardSecurityManager are required to 
have associated KeyStores and TrustStores.  [Oaks01] delineates the process by which to 
create a KeyStore and generate a private/public key Pair.  [Oaks01] delineates the process 
of generating a certificate corresponding to a key pair, and importing the certificate into 
an appropriate TrustStore.  
In order for an SSL socket to function, both the client and the server 
needed to have an SSLContext instantiated, that were initialized with the locations of the 
relevant KeyStores and TrustStores that the connections would use.  The KeyStores were 
named: .serverKeyStore and .clientKeyStore.  The TrustStores were named 
.serverTrustStore and .clientTrustStore.  These stores were placed in a folder called 
TestStores, and placed in the root directory (c:\).  Table 12 displays the described 
directory structure and relationships.  
 
Object KeyStore TrustStore 
SecureServer C:\TestStores\.serverKeyStore C:\TestStores\.serverTrustStore 
StandardSecurityManager C:\TestStores\.clientKeyStore C:\TestStores\.clientTrustStore 




The three main objects of the NSMS required various methods of 
communications.  This section describes the different communication links used. 
1. SecureServer – StandardSecurityManager  
Communication between the StandardSecurityManager and the SecureServer was 
performed through SSL connections.  Standard SSL protocol has only the server 
authenticating itself to the client.  However, in order to provide authentication of the 
StandardSecurityManager component to the SecureServer, the server’s SSLServerSocket 
was configured to ensure that the client authenticates itself to the server.   
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In order for the StandardSecurityManager to contact the SecureServer, it must 
hold the valid IP address for the server.  This parameter is hard coded into the 
getServerConnection method of the StandardSecurityManager with the following 
statement: ‘addr = InetAddress.getByName(“131.120.7.142”);’, where ‘addr’ is an 
InetAddress object.  The server is also hardwired to port 9096; this is identified in the 










Figure 4.    SecureServer / StaandardSecurityManager connection 
 
Once a successful SSL handshake is completed, the server creates a 
SecureServerConnection object that contains the SSL connection with the 
StandardSecurityManager.  All further communications occur through this object. 
With a SecureServerConnection established, the server’s only communication to 
the SecurityManger is the transmission of SecretKeyPack objects.  This lent itself to the 
use of Java’s Serialization interface, which converts objects into a series of bytes that can 
then be reconstituted into an object. 
Transmissions from the SecurityManager to the SecureServer encompassed 
passing an application’s ID to the server; and then, whenever a SecureFilter was created, 
registering that filter with the server.  Once a filter is registered, the server transmits the 
current SecretKeyPack that was assigned for that filter’s ID; if that ID had not been 





2. StandardSecurityManager – Filters 
The main communications between the SecurityManager and filters are 
performed through the use of SecurityManager and SecurityManagerSubscriber 








Figure 5.   Communication Interfaces Between StandardSecurityManager and the filters 
 
3. Filter – Filter 
The main communications between the individual filters, and between the filters 
and the channel and NetworkController objects are performed through the use of 
PropertyBearerListener and ReceivedPacketListener interfaces as described earlier.  










Figure 6.   Communication Interfaces between filters 
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Figure 6 shows how an outbound packet travels from the NetworkController 
through the connections established through the PropertyBearerListener interfaces out to 
the network.  Incoming packets likewise are received from the network by a channel 
object; the packets then travel up the application through the connections established by 
the ReceivedPacketListener interface.  Each filter in this sequence performs their specific 
operations on the data passing through it, and then passes the new data to the next filter. 
E. FILTERS 
These filters perform unique manipulations on the data contained in a DataPacket.  
The data is in the form of byte arrays of arbitrary length.  Each filter removes the data 
array, manipulates it as necessary, and then generates a new DataPacket with the new 
data array, and passes it off to the next module, be it a NetworkController, filter, or 
channel object. 
1. SequenceFilter 
This filter performs sequencing operations on the DataPackets.  The purpose 
behind this is to avoid replay attacks in which an attacker listening on the network makes 
copies of legal packets and then resends the packets, in the hopes that the packets will be 
accepted as legitimate. Since the packets were originally encrypted with a legitimate key, 
and the message digest code is correct, detecting replayed packets is a non-trivial 
problem. If this technique is not countered, attackers can force certain events to re-occur 
at will. Typically this type of attack is countered by adding unique information to each 
packet so that duplicate packets can be detected and rejected. Appendix D contains the 
code for this filter. 
  When first instantiated, this filter selects a random, four-byte integer as the 
beginning sequence number.  For outbound packets, it appends the application’s eight-
byte ID and a four-byte sequencing number into the beginning of the data array, thus 
creating a new byte array that is twelve bytes larger than the original; Figure 7 depicts 
this operation.  It then creates a new DataPacket with this data array and passes it to the 
next filter or channel.   The sequence number is incremented after each packet.  When the 
sequence number reaches the maximum integer value of 231-1, it rolls the sequence 
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Figure 7.   Outbound Data Before and After the SequenceFilter 
 
On incoming DataPackets, this filter performs sequence number verification, 
using the appSequenceTable, a HashTable object, called in which it maintains known 
application IDs and the most recent sequence number observed for that ID.  When it 
receives an inbound packet, it retrieves the data array and removes the application ID and 
the sequence number.  It sends these two items through a checkIDandSequence method 
for verification.   
The checkIDandSequence method first checks to see that the application ID is not 
the same as the host application ID; if it is the same, the method signals for the packet to 
be rejected.   Next, the method checks the appSequenceTable for the presence of that 
particular ID; if the ID is present then the sequence number is checked against the last 
seen sequence number to ensure that it is within twenty increments one of the last packet 
received from that application; this is to take into account the possible packet loss when 
dealing with UDP connections.  If the number is legitimate, then the sequence number is 
replaced in the table and the method signals that the packet is good.   If the application ID 
is not present, then the filter accepts it as a legitimate ID, and adds it and its sequence 
number to the appSequenceTable, then signals to accept the packet.  If the DataPacket is 
accepted, then the filter creates a new DataPacket with the data portion of the data array, 
and passes it to the next filter or network controller. 
2. IntegrityFilter 
This filter performs integrity operations on the DataPackets.  The purpose behind 
this is to ensure that the data transmitted in the data array has not been altered, either 
through inadvertent corruption or malicious attack.  The integrity feature is provided 
64 
through the use of a MessageDigest object from the Java Security API.  Refer to 
appendix E for this filter’s code.  This filter uses two MessageDigest objects: 
transmitMessageDigester and messageDigestChecker.   
For outbound packets, this filter takes the data array and provides it to the 
transmitMessageDigester.  It then calls the objects digest method, which produces the 
message digest as an array of bytes.  The MessageDigest objects in the filter use the 
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA), which produces a twenty byte message digest on any 
length of byte array that is provided.   In anticipation of future functionality that may 
produce variable sized message digests, the length of the digest is then determined.  The 
length of the digest, as a one-byte integer, and the digest are then appended to the 
beginning of the data array (see Figure 8) and a new DataPacket is created with the new 
data array.  The packet is then delivered to the next outbound filter or channel.  As this 
filter currently functions, it increases the size of any original array by twenty-one bytes. 
 
Data
Len : Length of digest
MD : Message Digest
IntegrityFilter MD DataLen
 
Figure 8.   Outbound Data Before and After the IntegrityFilter 
 
On incoming DataPackets, this filter performs message digest verification.  When 
it receives an inbound packet, it retrieves the data array and removes the one-byte length, 
and subsequently the message digest.  It then provides the message digest and the 
remaining data array to the verifyDigest method for verification processing.      
The verifyDigest method uses the messageDigestChecker to produce another 
message digest on the provided data array.  This new digest is compared to the provided 
digest.  If the digests are identical, then the method signals that the data has not been 
modified and is okay to continue.  If the data is verified to be unmodified, then the filter 
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creates a new DataPacket with the data portion of the data array, and sends it up the 
application.  
3. SecureFilter 
This filter performs cryptographic operations on the DataPackets.  This addresses 
the communication confidentiality of the DataPackets.  Cryptographic operations are 
conducted using the Cipher object from the JCE extension of the Java Security API.  The 
filter contains two of these Cipher objects: encipherer and decipherer.  Details on the 
initialization of these ciphers are discussed in section G.3.b.  Refer to appendix F for this 
filter’s implementation.     
For outbound packets, this filter takes the data array and provides it to the 
encipherData method.  Within this method the data array is passed to the encipherer and 
the data is encrypted by providing its doFinal method.  A new byte array is then formed 
with the current key’s four-byte ID and the encrypted data array, which will have 
increased in size to be a multiple of eight bytes; this is due to the requirement for 
ciphering in sixty-four bit blocks by the cipher in chaining mode.  The new data array is 
then returned.  A new DataPacket is formed with the array, and then sent to the next 
outbound filter or channel, as shown in Figure 9.  The current implementation of this 
filter increases the size of the original array by four to eleven bytes. 
 
Data
KeyID : ID of encryption Key
SecureFilter KeyID Encrypted Data
 
Figure 9.   Outbound Data Before and After the SecureFilter 
 
The filter performs decryption operations on incoming DataPackets.  When the 
filter receives an inbound packet, it retrieves the data array and provides it to the 
decipherData method.  Here, the key ID is separated from the encrypted data array.  The 
key ID is then checked to ensure it is the same as the filter’s current active key; if not, an 
exception is raised.  Otherwise, the encrypted data is passed to the decipherer, and its 
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doFinal method is called, producing the deciphered byte array.  This new data array is 
then returned.  Next, the filter then creates a new DataPacket with the data array, and 
sends it up the application.  
This filter is the most complicated of all the filters designed in the NSMS so far.  
There is an infrastructure used for managing the SecretKeyPacks within the SecureFilter.  
This infrastructure is described in section G.3.  
F. MODULE MANAGEMENT 
In theory, an infinite number of participants could exist simultaneously in an 
RTEVE.  Here we discuss how the SecurityManagers and the filters would be used to 
support large numbers of participants.   
1. Management of SecurityManagers  
The SecureServer must be able to manage any number of 
StandardSecurityManager connections.  This is accomplished through the use of a unique 
identifier for every StandardSecurityManager, and through the SecureServer’s use of an 
efficient data structure to track the StandardSecurityManager connections. 
a. Application ID 
When a StandardSecurityManager is first instantiated, it determines a 
unique eight-byte identifier by concatenating a series of four random bytes to the four–
byte IP address; it then determines the long integer that this eight-byte sequence 
represents.  This long is then identified as the applicationLong.  This is designed to avoid 
collision of identifiers when several applications are sharing IP addresses.  There does 
exist the possibility of collision, but it is deemed a very remote chance when dealing with 
four random bytes.  
b. SecureServer’s Role 
The SecureServer manages the StandardSecurityManagers, through the 
use of a Vector that contains each SecureServerConnection object, one 
SecureServerConnection per StandardSecurityManager.  If a socket connection is 
dropped, the SecureServer handles the exception by removing the 
SecureServerConnection object and deregistering any filters that were attributed to that 
SecureServerConnection.   
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2. Management of Filters 
The management of the filters is crucial to the security of the application, 
particularly with the SecureFilter.   
a. Filter ID and Type 
Since it is possible to have hundreds of filters within the same application, 
every filter must be distinguishable: distinguishable from other types of filters, and 
distinguishable from others of the same type.  In order to identify different types of 
filters, the SecurityManagerSubscriber interface contains three constants that are used for 
filter identification: SECURE_FILTER_TYPE, SEQUENCE_FILTER_TYPE, and 
INTEGRITY_FILTER_TYPE.  This method is used in order to provide a common base 
for all modules to be able to identify types. 
In order to distinguish a filter from others of the same type, a unique string 
must be passed into the filter during instantiation.  This is performed by adding a line to 
the XML configuration file to call the setID method of the filter, and providing an 
identifying name.      
b. StandardSecurityManager’s Role 
The StandardSecurityManager maintains three Vector objects, one for each type 
of filter.  When a filter registers itself with StandardSecurityManager, the 
SecurityManager retrieves the filter’s type and ID, adding the filter to the appropriate 
vector.  If the filter is a SecureFilter object, the StandardSecurityManager then registers 
the filter with the SecureServer.   
When the StandardSecurityManager receives a SecretKeyPack from the 
SecureServer for a filter it contains, it immediately hands the SecretKeyPack to the 
SecureFilter for processing.    
c. SecureServer’s Role 
The SecureServer maintains two HashTables that it uses in managing 
SecureFilters.  The filterConnectionTable maintains a list of all active SecureFilters that 
have been registered with the server, along with a vector that contains every 
SecureServerConnection object that holds that particular filter.  This is used to efficiently 
identify what SecureServerConnections need to receive a SecretKeyPack that is intended 
for use by a particular filter.  
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The FilterKeyTable is used to efficiently map an active SecureFilter with 
its currently active SecretKeyPack.  This way, when a SecureServerConnection registers 
a filter that already exists, it will immediately receive the SecretKeyPack that is in use by 
the other SecureServerConnections with the same filter, and the filter can immediately 
begin to communicate with its clones in other applications. 
G. KEY MANAGEMENT 
Key management is fairly straightforward within the NSMS.  It begins with the 
generation of keys by the SecureServer, and ends with the SecureFilter managing the key 
changes.  The central object within this area is the SecretKeyPack, presented in section  
1. SecureServer  
The SecureServer is at the heart of the key management infrastructure of the 
NSMS.  It handles generation, distribution and tracking of all keys for all of the 
SecureFilters. 
a. Key Generation 
The SecureServer uses the KeyMaker to generate needed SecretKeyPacks.  
For this implementation of the NSMS, a graphical user’s interface, the SecureServerGUI, 
was created testing the key-generation functions of the system.  It contains buttons that 
allow for generation of a SecretKeyPack destined for all SecureFilters.  In addition it 
contains a button that initiates a continuous generation of SecretKeyPacks at an interval 
identified in the server.  It contains a button that switches the random key algorithm 
capability on and off.   Also, whenever an individual SecureFilter is registered, a button 
is added to the GUI that allows for a SecretKeyPack to be generated and sent just to that 
filter.  
Upon request for a new SecretKeyPack, the KeyMaker generates a new 
key by using a KeyGenerator object that is set to the currently selected algorithm (DES, 
DESede, or Blowfish).  It then generates a random array of eight bytes for use as the 
initialization vector that will be used by the ciphers in the SecureFilters for the purposes 
of chaining.  The KeyMaker then instantiates a SecretKeyPack that contains the key, the 
initialization vector, and all other information necessary for the proper handling of the 
key and functioning of the ciphers; refer to section C.4.c for details on the SecretKeyPack 
data. 
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b. Key Distribution 
The SecureServer handles the distribution of keys through the use of the 
filterConnectionTable.  When a SecretKeyPack is generated for a particular filter, it runs 
through the SecureServerConnections contained in the vector associated with the filter 
and sends the SecretkeyPack to each one.   
c. Key Tracking 
Key tracking is handled through the use of the filterKeyTable.  This table 
contains the active SecureFilter IDs and their corresponding active SecretKeyPacks.  
2. StandardSecurityManager 
The StandardSecurityManager perform minimal actions with the SecretKeyPacks.  
When one arrives from the SecureServer, it looks at the ID of the filter it is intended for, 
and passes it to the filter.  No tracking is performed by the StandardSecurityManager.  
Since the filter will maintain the SecretKeyPacks, there is no need for the 
StandardSecurityManager object to do so as well.       
3. Secure Filter 
The SecureFilter performs the detailed key management operations.  It handles 
immediate key changes, and schedules and executes future key changes based on the 
indicated active period of the received KeyPacks. 
a. Key Tracking 
The SecretKeyPack that is currently active is identified as the 
currentKeyPack, all cryptographic operations on outbound and inbound DataPackets are 
performed by referencing the data in this keypack.  All SecretKeyPacks that are received 
for future activation are placed in the nextKeyPacks Vector in order of its start time. 
b. Key Changing 
The SecureFilter performs a key change by shutting down the filter’s 
transmission and reception capabilities, instantiating two new Cipher objects with the key 
parameter information contained in the SecretKeyPack.  These two ciphers, the 
encipherer and decipherer, are then initialized with the initialization vector and the new 
key provided by the SecretKeyPack.  The filter’s transmission and reception flows are 
then restarted. 
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If a key pack is received with a start time that is in the past, the 
SecureFilter performs an immediate key-change operation in which all awaiting key 
packs are removed from the Vector, and a key change is performed.  When the active 
period has not yet begun, a TimerTask object, that includes the changeKeys method of the 
filter, is created.  This task is then handed to a Timer object, along with the delay before 
the active period begins.  The Timer ensures that the TimerTask is begun at the 
appropriate time.  When the TimerTask is tripped, the appropriate key change is 
performed. 
H. NSMS XML CONFIGURATION FILES 
An XML configuration file for a sample NSMS containing world is presented in 
Appendix C.  The application represented in this configuration file contains a 
StandardSecurityManager and four filters.  One Secure filter, that is assigned an ID of 
‘sec96’ and is placed by itself before a multicast channel that transmit/receives on 
address 225.93.23.96.  The remaining three filters are placed in series before a multicast 
channel transmitting/receiving on address 225.93.23.92.  The three filters, in outbound 
order are: SequenceFilter ‘seq92’, IntegrityFilter ‘int92’, and SecureFilter ‘sec92’.  This 
indicates that a DataPacket will first be processed by the SequenceFilter, then that packet 
will be processed by the IntegrityFilter, and finally that packet will be processed by the 
SecureFilter before being transmitted over the multicast channel.    The XML files used 
for testing purposes are identified in Table 13, along with the implemented filters and 
their IDs. 
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XML File contained filters Filter ID
secure_server.xml n/a n/a
secure_a.xml SecureFilter sec96
secure_b.xml SequenceFilter    seq92
     IntegrityFilter int92
          SecureFilter sec92
SecureFilter sec96
secure_c.xml SequenceFilter    seq92
     IntegrityFilter int92
          SecureFilter sec92
SequenceFilter    seq93
secure_d.xml SequenceFilter    seq92
     IntegrityFilter int92
          SecureFilter sec92
IntegrityFilter int 95
secure_e.xml IntegrityFilter int95
secure_f.xml SequenceFilter    seq93
All xml files are located in: npsnetv\applications\tests
The last two digits of a filterID equate to a Multicast channel  
Table 13.   NSMS test XML Configuration Files 
 
 
I. NSMS WEAKNESSES 
There are several weaknesses that have been identified with the NSMS as it 
currently is implemented.  These are: 
· The centralized server architecture.  This poses a single-point-of-failure 
vulnerability for the system. Also, if the server were to be subverted, then 
the subverting entity would have complete control of the interaction 
capabilities of the system. 
· The keys that are held by the SecureServer and the SecureFilters are 
vulnerable as they reside in memory.  If a malicious entity had access to 
the system, and could determine where the keys resided in memory, the 
malicious entity might try to reconstitute the keys to gain access to the 
data packet transmissions.  
· The KeyStores contain the public/private key pairs and certificates.  If 
copies of these are acquired by a malicious entity, then that entity could 
use the key pairs or certificates for authentication purposes and potentially 
gain access to the worlds. 
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· The SequenceFilter currently will trust any new application ID that it sees, 
without authenticating it.  If a malicious entity were able to inject packets 
without registering with the SecureServer, the SequenceFilter would trust 
them and accept them as a valid user.  Authentication is assumed through 
the use of a SecureFilter combined with an IntegrityFilter(i.e., if the 
incoming packet has an active key, and the packet decrypts correctly, and 
the packet has a valid message digest, then it is presumed to have 
originated from an authenticated application that possesses valid 
encryption keys).  This requires the use of a SecureFilter with the 
IntegrityFilter.  The SequenceFilter should be able to authenticate on its 
own, possibly by verifying the new application ID with the SecureServer.  
· The IntegrityFilter currently uses a MessageDigest, which, if not used in 
conjunction with the SecureFilter, would be vulnerable to attacks.  If the 
IntegrityFilter were to be used alone, then a MAC that requires the use of 
shared keys to generate the digests might be more appropriate to use.  This 
would still maintain the authentication aspect due to the shared secret key 
that was used.  Public key encryption could also be used to encrypt and 
digitally sign the message digest and provide a layer of security for the 
integrity operations, as well as provide non-repudiation characteristics.  
However, this possesses two major drawbacks for state data packet 
transmissions:  It would require a complicated public key distribution 
capability; and, more importantly, the public key encryption algorithms 
would induce too great a delay in packet processing. 
J. KEY DISTRIBUTION LATENCY PROBLEM 
Synchronized key changes amongst all StandardSecurityManagers would be a 
non-issue if packet distribution from the SecureServer were instantaneous.  However, the 
issue of latency is a challenge when dealing with this issue.  Figure 10 depicts the 
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Figure 10.   Delay diagram of NSMS architecture 
 
 
One impact on the performance of the system is the time it takes for a key to be 
distributed to all participants.  If there were n participants and the time it takes for a key 
to be transmitted to a participant is t, then the total time required for all participants to 
receive the new key would be (n*t).  Since a disparity in the keys held by the participants 
would occur when the first participant received their key, then the time between the first 
and last participants receiving their keys would be ((n-1)*t).  If the key on the hosts is 
changed immediately upon receipt, this means that during this period of time the entire 
set of hosts will not have a consistent shared key. Thus the messages of some hosts will 
be unintelligible to others. This problem can be minimized by coordinating a time at 
which the switchover will occur. The SecureServer sends out a new key along with a time 
that all hosts will switch to the new key. The hosts (which are assumed to have 
synchronized clock times) all switch to the new key at the same time. The coordinated 
switchover approach works well for routine shared key changes. However, if we suspect 
the key is compromised, or if one host leaves the VE and we wish to minimize the 
amount of data that is transmitted with a compromised key, we may accept a period of 
mutual unintelligibility in order maximize data security. 
The second aspect of this problem is the latency between hosts in the VE.  If the 
longest latency between any two participants were Lmax then it would take Lmax time 
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before one of those participants would see a packet encrypted with the new key from the 
other participant. Assuming that all hosts switch to a new key at the same time, the 
packets already in the network that were encrypted with the old key would still be in 
transit, and therefore arriving over a period of Lmax. 
The two above mentioned aspects must be taken into account by a SecureServer 
when generating a new key, in order to ensure minimal impact due to mismatched keys 
amongst participants.  This theoretical minimum time delay between the transmittal of a 
key to the first host, and the beginning of the key’s active period can be computed to as: 
(n-1)*t + Lmax.  This requires that the SecureServer be aware of the performance within 
the network, in order to accurately identify the network’s latency. 
K. SUMMARY 
In this chapter we gave an overview of desirable characteristics and requirements 
that a comprehensive security management system for an RTEVE should possess.  Our 
NSMS is not an all-encompassing solution.  Rather, it is the beginning of a more 
comprehensive approach for addressing issues of security in RTEVEs. 
Figure 11 depicts an NSMS in a two-application environment in which two 
channels of communication are being used.  One channel is a TCP/IP connection that has 
a SecureFilter encrypting the data that is transmitted.  The second communication 
channel is a UDP multicast channel in which the data packets are sent through a 
SequentialFilter, then an IntegrityFilter, and finally through a SecureFilter (the 
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Figure 11.   NSMS in a Two Application Environment  
 
The next chapter documents the results from several studies performed on the 
filters that were designed.  The studies were conducted to identify the impact of the filter 
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V. PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF NSMS CAPABILITIES 
This chapter presents a beginning analysis of the NSMS filters with respect to the 
amount of delay induced by their algorithms.  This provides insight into the effects of 
these security mechanisms on data-packet-flow performance of a large scale VE.  Since 
reliability is more of a system-level concern, we choose to focus on investigating delay 
and bandwidth. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There has always been a concern with the impact of security features on the 
performance of a networked VE.  These studies were designed to identify the impact that 
the security-enabling filters introduced in this thesis would have on the QOS concerns 
identified in chapter II.     
B. SYSTEM SET-UP 
Since the studies were focused on the performance of the application’s filters, it 
was necessary to ensure that the application would have its own dedicated host; 
otherwise, performance would be impacted by the presence of the server on the same 
computing platform.  Therefore a dual-platform configuration was devised with the 
SecureServer and an individual NPSNET-V application operating on separate computers.    
1. Server  
The server was hosted on an IBM ThinkPad iSeries 600 MHz Celeron laptop, 
with 192MB RAM and the Windows2000 operating system.  It was connected to the 
local area network through standard 100 mbit/sec Ethernet cabling.   
2. Experiment Applications  
The NPSNET-V applications were hosted on a Dell Dimension 4100 Intel P-III 
1GHz desktop, with 256MB RAM, and the Windows2000 operating system.  This too 
was connected to the local area network through standard Ethernet cabling.   
Base performance characteristics of the filters were of interest.  Each 
experimental VE application was designed with only one entity in order to produce a 
stream of constant-size data packets.  In order to avoid the impact of computation by 
graphical processes, the 3-dimensional viewing components were not included in the test 
applications.  The only processes executing, other than the study application, were the 
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primary process threads of Windows2000 running in the background; this ensured that 
the application under study would be the only main draw on processor resources. 
C. GENERAL STUDY DESIGN 
In order to gather time statistics within the filter, Java’s System.currentTimeMillis 
method was used to retrieve the current time in milliseconds as a long value.  Since most 
processing was believed to be on the sub-millisecond level, this would present precision 
errors.  In order to alleviate this concern, a decision was made to encase the functional 
areas of each filter in a for-loop that would loop through the encased algorithm for 10000 
iterations.  The system time was recorded on entering and exiting the loop. The difference 
between the times was then divided by the number of loop iterations, with the resulting 
value being attributed to one cycle of the algorithm.  This for-loop was then executed 
thirty times and averages determined to produce one data point, with each data point 
representing thirty runs of 10000 iterations. Ten data points were then accumulated for 
each parameter set of the individual studies and analysis performed.      
We compared the execution times of the algorithms by the size of the data arrays.  
In order to produce this effect, each study used two different NPSNET-V applications, 
each containing a different entity that produced different sized packets.  The generated 
packets had byte arrays with lengths of 116 and 156 bytes.  These packet sizes are fairly 
typical for many VE network protocols, such as DIS.  Packets with data of length 116 
bytes were produced by the StandardExplosionManager entity, while data packets of 156 
were produced by the teapot entity.  
Due to the number of iterations for each sample, precision of the execution times 
was limited to three decimal points.  One thousandth of a millisecond precision was 
deemed sufficient for this study.  Therefore, where there seems to be no difference in 
execution comparisons, there may in fact be a small difference, albeit minute.    
All studies include results on both the outbound and inbound packet handling 
algorithms.  Separate for-loops were used on each algorithm within the same filter, and 
were performed in alternating order using the same data.  That is, one packet was run 
through the outbound process, and then that resultant packet was processed through the 
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inbound algorithm; the same cycle was repeated thirty times to produce one data point on 
each algorithm.   
D. SECURE FILTER DELAY STUDY 
This study delved into the effects of the enciphering and deciphering capabilities 
of the filter.  Concern has always been expressed that the delay induced by these 
processes would negatively impact QOS, and thus is usually not considered with respect 
to entity data packets. 
1. Study Design 
This study was designed to look at the impact of the actual SecureFilter’s 
enciphering and deciphering algorithms, and that introduced by the actual ciphering and 
deciphering of the data when using the three different keying algorithms of DES, 
DESede, and Blowfish (Blowfish was set to use the maximum key size of 448 bits).  Note 
that the data sizes in the charts of this section indicate the size of the data arrays that are 
being passed into the actual cipher/deciphering portion of the algorithm; in the case of 
156/160, 156 bytes are entering the enciphering Cipher, while 160 bytes are entering the 
deciphering cipher. This is caused by padding in the encryption algorithm that generates 
ciphered data in chunks of eight bytes. One hundred fifty six bytes are padded out to the 
next multiple of eight bytes, 160 bytes.  The deciphering algorithm therefore receives 160 
bytes and produces deciphered data of 156 bytes.   
The first two experiments focused on the execution times of the SecureFilter’s 
algorithms and the actual cipher/decipher calls respectively.  The third experiment 
focused on the impact due to different key sizes when using the Blowfish algorithm; and 
the last experiment focused on the processing impact caused by the SecureFilter’s 
operation during the execution of the encryption operations. 
2. Results  
Analysis of Enciphering/Deciphering Algorithm Execution Time: This 
experiment was designed to provide data on the filter’s ciphering and deciphering 
algorithm for data array sizes of 156 and 116 bytes.  It was performed using the three 
identified keying algorithms.  Results of this experiment are shown in Table 14, and 
indicate that: 
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· Overall execution times of the algorithms increase as you go from 
Blowfish to DES, and then to DESede for both enciphering and 
deciphering. The data indicates that Blowfish is approximately 0.017 
milliseconds faster than DES, and 0.092 milliseconds faster than DESede 
for enciphering, and 0.013/0.089 for deciphering. 
· Deciphering operations are less than 0.01 milliseconds slower than 
enciphering operations. 
· Blowfish, considered the strongest of the three algorithms to break, was 
the fastest of all, even though it was set with the largest key size of all. 
 
SecureFilter Algorithm (milliseconds)
data size: 156/172 bytes data size: 116/132 bytes
Algorthm Encipher Decipher Algorithm Encipher Decipher
DES 0.048 0.053 DES 0.036 0.040
DESede 0.123 0.127 DESede 0.092 0.096
Blowfish 0.031 0.035 Blowfish 0.024 0.026  
Table 14.   Average Execution Times for SecureFilter Encipher/Deciphering                                                                                                                              
Algorithms per Key Algorithm 
 
A comparison of the algorithms based on differing data array sizes is provided in 
Table 15.  This comparison indicates the following: 
· The execution time difference between enciphering and deciphering is 
virtually the same for each key algorithm, with the largest disparity 
residing with the Blowfish algorithm.   
· A data size difference of forty bytes has an impact on the algorithms that 
is measurable only in the hundredth-of-a-millisecond range, a negligible 
difference.      
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SecureFilter Algorithm (milliseconds)
Algorithm Data size Encipher Decipher
DES 156/160 bytes 0.048 0.053
116/120 bytes 0.036 0.040
difference: 0.012 0.013
DESede 156/160 bytes 0.123 0.127
116/120 bytes 0.092 0.096
difference: 0.031 0.031
Blowfish 156/160 bytes 0.031 0.035
116/120 bytes 0.024 0.026
difference: 0.007 0.009  
Table 15.   Comparison of the SecureFilter’s Encipher/Decipher                                            
Algorithm Execution Times in Relation to Data Array Size  
 
Analysis of Cipher’s Encipher/Decipher Execution Times:  This experiment 
was designed to provide data on the Cipher object’s ciphering and deciphering process 
for data array sizes of 156 and 116.  This information, compared to the data from 
experiment one, provided an indication of what delay was introduced by the non-cipher 
portions of the filter algorithms.  Results of this experiment are shown in Table 16, 
indicating the following: 
· Ciphering and deciphering operations using DESede are 200% slower than 
when using DES.   
· Ciphering and deciphering operations using Blowfish are 50% faster than 
when using DES.  
· There is negligible difference (in the thousandths of a millisecond) in 





data size: 156/172 bytes data size: 116/132 bytes
Algorthm Encipher Decipher Algorithm Encipher Decipher
DES 0.046 0.050 DES 0.034 0.037
DESede 0.120 0.123 DESede 0.090 0.093
Blowfish 0.028 0.032 Blowfish 0.022 0.023  
Table 16.   Average Execution Times for Cipher Encipher/Decipher Call per Key Algorithm 
 
A comparison of the Cipher enciphering/deciphering calls on differing data array 
sizes is provided in Table 17.  These results indicate that the Blowfish, DES, and DESede 
enciphering execution times are affected by differences in data array sizes.  The affect 
was approximately 0.007, 0.011 and 0.03 milliseconds slower for an array difference of 
forty bytes.   
 
Cipher call comparisons (milliseconds)
Algorithm Data size Encipher Decipher
DES 156/160 bytes 0.046 0.050
116/120 bytes 0.034 0.037
difference: 0.012 0.013
DESede 156/160 bytes 0.120 0.123
116/120 bytes 0.090 0.093
difference: 0.030 0.030
Blowfish 156/160 bytes 0.028 0.032
116/120 bytes 0.022 0.023
difference: 0.006 0.009  
Table 17.   Comparison of the Cipher Object’s Encipher/Decipher Execution                        
Times in Relation to Data Array Size  
 
The difference between the algorithms and the cipher execution times is shown in 
Table 18.  These results indicate that the average execution time of the filter per encipher 
and decipher that is attributable to the non-cipher algorithm is less than 0.003 
milliseconds.  Thus the performance of the filter rests predominantly with the key 
algorithm in use.  
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Difference Between Algorithm and Cipher Call (milliseconds)
data size: 156/172 bytes data size: 116/132 bytes
Algorthm Encipher Decipher Algorithm Encipher Decipher
DES 0.002 0.004 DES 0.002 0.003
DESede 0.003 0.004 DESede 0.002 0.003
Blowfish 0.003 0.003 Blowfish 0.002 0.003
Average: 0.003  
Table 18.   Differences Between Method Call and Cipher call 
 
Analysis of the Blowfish Algorithm Encipher/Decipher Execution Times:  
This experiment was designed to determine the effect of different key sizes on the 
encipher/decipher execution times of the Blowfish key algorithm.  The three key sizes 
used were: 56, 128, and 448 bits.  Results of this experiment are shown in Table 19, and 
indicate that key size appears to have a negligible influence, of less than 0.001 
milliseconds, on enciphering and deciphering times.  There is no reason to use less than 
448-bit encryption since it has no adverse impact.  
Blowfish cipher times (milliseconds) 
KeySize Encipher Decipher
56 bits 0.022 0.023
128 bits 0.022 0.023
448 bits 0.022 0.023  
Table 19.   Average Blowfish Encipher/Decipher Execution                                                         
Times for Varying Key Sizes 
 
Analysis of the CPU usage impact:  This experiment was designed to identify 
the impact of SecureFilter operations on CPU usage.  The SecureFilter was using the 
Blowfish algorithm with a 448-bit key size.  The frequency of data packet production was 
manipulated to produce three different rates: 30, 60, and 120Hz.  The CPU readings were 
taken by using the system performance tab of the Windows2000 Task Manager, and 
observing the minimum, maximum, and the predominant range during a two minute time 
frame.   The results are provided in Table 20, and indicate that the impact of a single 
SecureFilter on CPU usage is negligible at less than four percent at 120Hz.  
 
84 
Impact of SecureFilter on CPU usage
packet size: 156 bytes
rate min/max predominant
30 Hz 0/3% 0-2%
60HZ 0/4% 0-3%
120HZ 1/4% 1-3%  
Table 20.   CPU Usage during SecureFilter operation  
 
E. SEQUENCE FILTER DELAY STUDY 
We also explored the effects of the sequencing operations of the filter.  We did 
not expect the delay introduced by this filter to be significant. 
1. Study Design 
As identified in section C of this chapter, the outbound algorithm in the 
sendPacket method and inbound algorithm in the packetReceived method are 
encapsulated in a for-loop.  This experiment was also performed on data array sizes of 
156 and 116 bytes. Note that the data sizes in the charts of this section indicate the size of 
the data arrays that are passed through the transmit and receive algorithms; in the case of 
156/168, 156 bytes are entering the transmit algorithm, while 168 bytes (four-byte 
sequence number plus eight-byte application ID plus 156 byte data array) enter the 
receive algorithm.   
2. Results  
Results of this experiment are shown in Table 21 below.  The results indicate the 
following: 
· Overall execution time of the transmit algorithm is 0.002 milliseconds, 
and is not dependent on the size of the data that is provided. 
· Overall execution time of the receive algorithm is 0.004 milliseconds.  
The apparent difference in times due to data size is curious, yet not 
significant.  There is nothing in the code that can account for this. 
· The reception times are twice that of the transmittal times; this is due to 
accessing of the hash tables to verify the application ID and sequence 
number of the incoming packets. 
85 
· An average of 0.006 milliseconds is required for sequencing operations to 
be performed on a data packet from one host to another. 
· The impact of this filter on delay is negligible. 
SequenceFilter-induced delay (milliseconds)
Data size (bytes) Transmit Receive Total Time
116/128 0.002 0.004 0.006
156/168 0.002 0.004 0.006
Difference 0.000 0.001 0.001  
Table 21.   Average Execution Times for SequenceFilter’s transmit and receive Algorithms 
 
F. INTEGRITY FILTER DELAY STUDY 
We also investigated the effects of the sequencing operations of the filter.  We did 
not expect to observe a significant delay. 
1. Study Design 
The outbound algorithm in the sendPacket method and inbound algorithm in the 
packetReceived method are encapsulated in a for-loop.  This experiment was also 
performed on data array sizes of 156 and 116 bytes. Note that the data sizes in the charts 
of this section indicate the size of the data arrays that are passed through the transmit and 
receive algorithms; in the case of 156/180, 156 bytes enter the transmittal algorithm, 
while 180 bytes (four-byte length plus twenty byte message digest plus 156 byte data 
array) enter the receive algorithm.   
2. Results 
Results of this experiment are shown in Table 22.  The results of the experiment 
indicate the following: 
· Overall execution time of the transmit algorithm ranges from 0.012 to 
0.018 milliseconds for an array of 116 and 156 bytes, respectively and 
appears to be dependent on the size of the data array provided to the 
MessageDigest object, as expected. 
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· Overall execution time of the receive algorithm ranges from 0.014 to 
0.020 milliseconds for an array of 140 and 180 bytes, respectively.  This 
also appears to be dependent on the data array size.   
· The reception times are approximately 0.002 milliseconds slower that the 
transmit algorithm, probably due to the message digest comparison call. 
· An average of 0.026 milliseconds is required for integrity operations to be 
performed on a 116-byte data packet from one host to another. 
· An average of 0.038 milliseconds is required for integrity operations to be 
performed on a 156-byte data packet from one host to another. 
· The impact of this filter on delay is negligible 
 
IntegrityFilter-induced delay (milliseconds)
Data size (bytes) Transmit Receive Total Time
116/140 0.012 0.014 0.027
156/180 0.018 0.020 0.038
Difference 0.006 0.006 0.012  
Table 22.   Average Execution Times for IntegrityFilter’s Transmit/Receive Algorithms 
 
 
G. ANALYSIS OF OVERALL DELAY IMPACT 
Each of the filters imposes some delay on the overall transmission of an 
individual packet.  An analysis of the total time delay that is induced on a packet by all 
the filters combined is provided in Table 23.  As the total delay column indicates, the 
delay imposed on a packet of 116 bytes ranges from 0.082 to 0.220 milliseconds; and the 
delay for a packet of 156 bytes ranges from 0.111 to 0.295 milliseconds.   
87 
Cipher Algorithm: DES
Data Size SecureFilter SequenceFilter IntegrityFilter Total delay
116 0.077 0.006 0.027 0.109
156 0.102 0.006 0.038 0.146
Cipher Algorithm: DESede
Data Size SecureFilter SequenceFilter IntegrityFilter Total delay
116 0.188 0.006 0.027 0.220
156 0.250 0.006 0.038 0.295
Cipher Algorithm: Blowfish
Data Size SecureFilter SequenceFilter IntegrityFilter Total delay
116 0.050 0.006 0.027 0.082
156 0.066 0.006 0.038 0.111  
Table 23.   Total Time Delay Induced by all Filters per Cipher algorithm 
 
Since the filters were not tested under heavy packet transmission conditions, it is 
difficult to say if the delays identified in these studies will continue to hold for other 
workloads.  Further tests need to be conducted to characterize these delays.  As the data 
indicates, the impact of the all the filters combined on delay is less than 0.3 for DESede 
and less than 0.12 milliseconds for Blowfish.  The use of these security measures appears 
to require very little overhead.  
H. ANALYSIS OF OVERALL BANDWIDTH IMPACT 
Each of the filters increases the size of the data packet that is transmitted across 
the network.  These increases accumulate and may impact the required bandwidth for a 
specific RTEVE system.  As identified in Chapter IV, and presented in Table 24, each of 
the filters impact the size of the data packet in differing amounts, based on the performed 
operations.   
 
Filter Increase to Data Array Size
SecureFilter 4 - 11 bytes
SequenceFilter 12 bytes
IntegrityFilter 21 bytes  
Table 24.   Filter Impact on Data Array Size 
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If all the filters are placed in series, the total increase to a data array would be 
thirty-seven to forty-four bytes.  Depending on the application structure this could be 
quite an increase in bandwidth requirement (i.e., if the average packet were 100 bytes in 
length, it has now been increased by 44%) or minimal (i.e. if the average packet were 300 
bytes in length, then the increase is only 15%).  Either way, the main impact would be a 
function of the average number of packets transmitting at any point in time.  If the 
average number of packets on the network is 10,000 per second, as is anticipated for a 
large scale VE with 1000 participants transmitting 10 packets per second, then the 
overhead alone for using the three filters would be increased by 440,000 bytes (3,520,000 
bits); this is not an insignificant amount of bandwidth particularly if dealing with low-
bandwidth communication lines.   However, since most VE systems currently use some 
form of dead reckoning algorithm to reduce the amount of packet transmissions, the 
overhead caused by the increased packet size is most likely tolerable.  Moreover, with 
communication lines reaching 10Gbps, the impact may be negligible in some 
environments.   
Considering that most sensitive RTEVE applications requiring high levels of 
security will tend to have dedicated high-bandwidth communication lines, the impact in 
these environments would be minimal.  A detailed analysis needs to be conducted in this 
area to better determine the impact in the general case. 
I. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented an analysis of the three types of filter objects that were 
designed as part of the NSMS.  The analysis covered the impact that these filters had on 
the areas of delay and bandwidth. This analysis is basic in scope and should be expanded 
before firm conclusions are made as to their impact on QOS.  However, it appears that 
the impact on delay is negligible, while the increase in required bandwidth is acceptable 
and CPU usage is within acceptable limits.  The following chapter summarizes the 








VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The research reported in this thesis serves as the basis for exploring a wide 
spectrum of information assurance areas, as they relate to RTEVEs.  We presented a 
taxonomy of RTEVE IA concerns, then explored some of the concerns in the context of a 
state-of-the-art RTEVE framework known as NPSNET-V.   
1. NSMS  
 The design of the filters supports the selection of the level of security to be 
applied in each virtual world.  The individual effects of the designed filters on delay and 
bandwidth were quantified.  The results lead us to conclude that security features on data 
packet transmissions are technically feasible for large-scale VE development with 
negligible impact on delay and acceptable impact on bandwidth.     
2. RTEVE Security 
 We discovered that the security of RTEVEs covers at least twenty-five 
different areas of information assurance.  Some areas have been significantly addressed 
by current research, while others have received little attention.  Nonetheless, each area 
must be addressed in some fashion whenever an RTEVE is developed, even if the 
decision is to not address it.  The level of security that is desired for an RTEVE must be 
identified by the intended user of the system, and then the system developed to those 
requirements.  
3. RTEVE Security System 
 A comprehensive RTEVE security system needs to have the ability to 
manage the RTEVE no matter how large it grows.  For a system such as NPSNET-V, 
with a goal of infinite scalability, this is a formidable challenge.  Secondly, it must 
contain a robust manner of detecting any intrusion whether known or novel, and 
successfully responding to neutralize the intrusion or minimize the impact, such as 
through intelligent management of the generation and distribution of encryption keys.  
However, there is still some likelihood that an attacker might find weaknesses in the 
security systems, or on the platforms in which the RTEVE resides. Therefore, we 
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conclude that the system should be updateable to allow for inclusion of new security 
policy and support mechanisms. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
The work accomplished in this thesis is merely a beginning to what can be a 
comprehensive distributed security management system for a VE.  New technologies are 
constantly being researched and developed. The following are functionalities that can be 
incorporated into this work for trusted RTEVEs. 
1. Perform a Comprehensive Statistical Analysis of the NSMS  
As briefly discussed in the previous chapter, the studies performed in this work 
are not comprehensive in addressing the impact on QOS issues.  A more thorough 
statistical analysis must be performed in order to identify the impact on QOS over ranges 
of system workloads.  This study should involve multiple applications, with hundreds of 
clients where possible, that are producing increasingly large numbers of data packets. 
2. Develop ‘Distributedness’ Capability of NSMS 
The ability of the NSMS to maintain desired levels of QOS and security as an 
NPSNET-V application expands must be assured.  A server-based structure is inefficient 
in a large-scale networked environment for many reasons, including the fact that it 
represents a single–point–of–failure. Also, key distribution to possibly thousands of 
participants is extremely inefficient, and would allow for a possibly compromised key to 
be active for an inordinate amount of time while a new key is distributed.  
A good starting point for this area would be to use the idea of a tree structure 
[Yerry84] for security management distribution, in which the management of security 
issues and keys is shared amongst all nodes of the tree.  Specific characteristics of this 
system would include: 
· The tree concept would allow for fast key distribution amongst all nodes 
of the tree.  The exponential increase in parallelism as the key traverses 
down the tree, with each node ensuring the distribution of the key to its 
siblings, allows for the operation of key distribution to be more efficient.   
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· The tree should be self-repairable; that is when a node is dropped from the 
tree, the tree structure below that node should be able to reconstitute itself 
back into the higher structure.   
· The tree must be self-policing, that is, if any node is acting suspicious, 
such as constantly changing the keys of its children for no reason, its 
children should be able to identify it as a subverted node, and remove it 
and reconstitute the tree from that point on forward. 
· Each node of the tree would be represented by a SecurityManager object 
within the NPSNET-V application that can act both as a server for the tree 
structure below it, and as the manager of filters for its own application. 
· To facilitate key management, each node should be the key manager for 
all filters below it that are not known anywhere else in the tree.  This way 
responsibility is maintained at the lowest level possible and does not 
unnecessarily burden higher level nodes in the tree. Each SecurityManager 
must be able to act as the server itself.  Or, each module can act as a key 
distribution point for any filters below it that are not known anywhere else 
in the structure. 
3. Intrusion Detection Capability 
An addition to any comprehensive security policy is the inclusion of an intrusion 
detection system, either signature- or anomaly-based.  The benefits of a good anomaly-
based system are obviously great and are preferred to those of a signature.  The IDS 
system concepts discussed in [Vigna98] and [Stillerman99] are an interesting place to 
proceed from.  Unfortunately, anomaly-based IDSs are still in their infancy and, 
therefore, beginning with a signature-based IDS to provide known intrusion detection 
would be a lower risk approach.   
4. Intrusion Response Capability 
Along with an intrusion detection capability, the system should possess an 
effective and efficient response capability in order to effectively protect the system and 
minimize effects of an attack.  Responses could take the form of denial of future 
connectivity to a malicious application, dynamic key changes in response to a discovered 
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compromise of the symmetric keys, or even the use of software decoys in order to learn 
more information about the attacker and the nature of the intrusion [Michael02].      
5. Increase Functionality of the NSMS 
The functionality of the NSMS can be expanded in many directions, such as the 
following: 
· Apply module integrity and authentication through the use of Jar-signing, 
message digests, or checksums. 
· Increase the capability of the filters by allowing the SecureServer to 
manipulate the message digest algorithms in the IntegrityFilter. 
· Connect the NSMS to a network monitor that informs the SecureServer of 
the current level of latency within the system, for the purpose of 
dynamically adjusting the generation and distribution of keys for the entire 
network with the aim of minimizing the period of key mismatch. 
· Incorporate an audit log that can be used for post-intrusion detection 
efforts.  The concerns that must be managed here are the trade-offs 
between amount of events that are recorded, amount of memory space 
available to use as a record file, and the rate at which the files are scanned 
for malicious activity.  Also, an adequate security measure needs to be 
provided for the log itself to prevent hackers from erasing their activities 
from the log.  
· Increase the number of key algorithms to choose from, and the breadth of 
chaining modes and padding schemes. Other providers have encryption 
packages that can be included for use with the system. 
· Have the sequence filter verify authenticity of new application IDs that 
appear on incoming packets with the SecureServer.  






A. SAMPLE CONFIGURATION FILE 
<?xml version="1.0"?> 
<Configuration> 
    <Header> 
        <Meta name="description" content="DIS networking test (first client)."/> 
        <Meta name="author" content="Andrzej Kapolka"/> 
    </Header> 
    <Body> 
        <Include url="../include/base.xml"/> 
        <Include url="../include/gui.xml"/> 
        <Include url="../include/dis.xml"/> 
        <Container name="client_a"> 
            <World name="org/npsnet/v/worlds/examples/EmptyWorld.xml" 
                   modelName="modelCore"> 
                <Entity name="org/npsnet/v/entities/cameras/PilotableCamera.xml" 
                        modelName="pilotableCamera"/> 
                <Entity name="org/npsnet/v/entities/examples/Teapot.xml" 
modelName="teapot_a"> 
                    <Transform translation="-5 0 -20"/> 
                </Entity> 
            </World> 
            <Module class="org.npsnet.v.views.j3d.J3DViewCore"> 
                <Target name="modelCore"/> 
                <Viewport title="NPSNET-V: DIS Networking Test (Client A)"  
                          xPos="128" camera="modelCore/pilotableCamera"/> 
            </Module> 
            <Module class="org.npsnet.v.controllers.user.AWTControllerCore"> 
                <Target name="modelCore"/> 
                <Module 
class="org.npsnet.v.controllers.user.MouseContextMenuController"/> 
                <Module class="org.npsnet.v.controllers.user.MouseTransformController"/> 
            </Module> 
            <Module class="org.npsnet.v.controllers.network.dis.DISControllerCore"> 
                <Target name="modelCore"/> 
                <Module class="org.npsnet.v.channels.AggregatingChannel"> 
                    <Module class="org.npsnet.v.channels.MulticastChannel"> 
                        <Address value="225.93.23.93"/> 
                    </Module> 
                </Module> 
            </Module> 
        </Container> 
    </Body> 
 
This configurations file generates a world that first incorporates three base functionality 
architectures identified as ‘Base.xml”, “gui.xml”, and “dis.xml.” These are attached beneath the 
Kernel of the system.  Below the Kernel, another container called “client a” is created.   This 
container holds four modules below it; those are: “EmptyWorld”, which contains a 
“pilotableCamera” entity and a “teapot” entity; “j3DViewCore”, which is associated with the 
pilotableCamera; “AWTControllerCore”, which contains a “MouseContextMenuController” and a 
“MouseTransformController” that are used for entity manipulation; and the “DISControllerCore”, 
which contains an “AggregatingChannel”, which contains a “MulticastChannel’ module.  
 This file will generate a world with a teapot that can be controlled with the 
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B. NPSNET-V SOURCE CODE 
It should be noted that the NSMS system developed in this thesis is not a 
standalone work.  Components of the system are spread throughout the module areas of 
NPSNET-V and can function only as modules of NPSNET-V.  The complete NPSNET-V 
system, including source code, documentation, and points of contact are located in a CVS 
repository at following webpage: 
http://sourceforge.net/projects/npsnetv/ 
NPSNET-V is constantly in progress.  Contributors and developers are welcome 
to join in the development efforts associated with this RTEVE project.  Contact one of 
the Project Administrators for information on the current status of the system and how to 
become a contributor.  
The below table identifies the locations of the NSMS source files discussed in this 
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C. SAMPLE NSMS XML CONFIGURATION FILE 
<?xml version="1.0"?> 
<Configuration> 
    <Header> 
        <Meta name="description" content="NSMS secure test B"/> 
        <Meta name="author" content="Andrzej Kapolka"/> 
    </Header> 
    <Body> 
        <Include url="../include/base.xml"/> 
        <Include url="../include/gui.xml"/> 
        <Include url="../include/dis.xml"/> 
        <Module class="org.npsnet.v.system.StandardSecurityManager"/> 
        <Container name="client_b"> 
            <World name="org/npsnet/v/worlds/examples/EmptyWorld.xml" 
                   modelName="modelCore"> 
                <Entity name="org/npsnet/v/entities/cameras/PilotableCamera.xml" 
                        modelName="pilotableCamera"/> 
                <Entity name="org/npsnet/v/entities/munitions/antiship/SphericalMine.xml" modelName="teapot_b"> 
                    <Transform translation="2 0 -20"/>  
                </Entity> 
                <Entity name="org/npsnet/v/entities/environment/StandardExplosionManager.xml"/> 
            </World> 
            <Module class="org.npsnet.v.views.j3d.J3DViewCore"> 
                <Target name="modelCore"/> 
                <Viewport title="NPSNET-V: DIS Networking Test (Client B)"  
                          xPos="656" camera="modelCore/pilotableCamera"/> 
            </Module> 
            <Module class="org.npsnet.v.controllers.user.AWTControllerCore"> 
                <Target name="modelCore"/> 
                <Module class="org.npsnet.v.controllers.user.MouseContextMenuController"/> 
                <Module class="org.npsnet.v.controllers.user.MouseTransformController"/> 
            </Module> 
            <Module class="org.npsnet.v.controllers.network.dis.DISControllerCore"> 
                <Target name="modelCore"/> 
                <Module class="org.npsnet.v.channels.SequenceFilter"> 
       <Set name="ID" value = "seq92"/> 
                    <Module class="org.npsnet.v.channels.IntegrityFilter"> 
           <Set name="ID" value = "int92"/> 
                        <Module class="org.npsnet.v.channels.SecureFilter"> 
                  <Set name="ID" value = "sec92"/> 
                            <Module class="org.npsnet.v.channels.MulticastChannel"> 
                                <Address value="225.93.23.92"/> 
                            </Module> 
                        </Module> 
                    </Module> 
                </Module> 
                <Module class="org.npsnet.v.channels.SecureFilter"> 
       <Set name="ID" value = "sec96"/> 
                    <Module class="org.npsnet.v.channels.MulticastChannel"> 
                        <Address value="225.93.23.96"/> 
                    </Module> 
                </Module> 
            </Module> 
        </Container> 
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 * A filter channel that performs Sequencing functions on the passed packets. 
 * The outbound packets have the 8-byte application ID and a 4-byte integer 
 * sequence number appended to the data before transmittal. 
 *  The sequence number is initialized to a random number in order to prevent 
 *  guessing by an attacker. 
 * 
 * incoming packets are verified for proper sequencing.  If the packet is the 
 *   first one seen from a previously unknown application, the filter wiil 
 *   register the application an dbegin tracking the sequence numbers. 
 *   the sequence number of any new packet must be at most 20 units greater than 
 *   the previously seen packet for that applicationID.  RollOver is followed, 
 *   that is when an application reaches the maximum integer value, it will 
 *   'rollover' and begin at the lowest integer value. 
 * This class can only function if a SecurityManager object is included in 
 *  the application structure. 
 *  Does not register with the securityManager until the setID method is called 
 *  by the XML confiduration file 
 * 
 * Any out of sequence and repeat packets will be dropped, thus addressing the 
 * replay attack. 
 * 
 * the 'filter' functionality is based on the aggregate filter authored 
 * by Andrzej Kapolka 
 * 
 * @author Ernesto Salles 
 */ 
 
public class SequenceFilter extends ModuleContainer 
                            implements Channel, ReceivedPacketListener, 
                                       PropertyBearerListener, 
                                       SecurityManagerSubscriber 
{ 
    /** 
    * boolean used to signal the filter to transmit 
    */ 
    boolean okToTransmit; 
 
    /** 
     * boolean used to signal the filter to receive 
     */ 
    boolean okToReceive; 
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    /** 
     * the sequence number for outbound packets from this filter 
     */ 
    int seqNum; 
 
    /** 
     * The application ID 
     */ 
    long applicationID; 
 
    /** 
     * The filter's ID 
     */ 
    String filterID; 
 
    /** 
     * The list of channel listeners. 
     */ 
    private Vector receivedPacketListeners; 
 
    /** 
     * The SecurityManager 
     */ 
    private SecurityManager securityManager; 
 
    /** 
     * the outputstream used to generate byte arrays 
     */ 
    ByteArrayOutputStream baos; 
 
    /** 
     * Used to input data into the baos 
     */ 
    DataOutputStream dos; 
 
    /** 
     * a table containing applications that are communicatig on this comms path, 
     *  and their sequence numbers for replay attack prevention 
     */ 
    Hashtable appSequenceTable; 
 
    /** 
     * Constructor.  Initialize the required objects and turns the filter off 
     */ 
    public SequenceFilter() 
    { 
        receivedPacketListeners = new Vector(); 
        this.endPacketTransmission(); 
        this.endPacketReception(); 
        applicationID = 0; 
        Random rnd = new Random(); 
        seqNum = rnd.nextInt(); 
        this.println("initial sequence number is: " + seqNum); 
        appSequenceTable = new Hashtable(); 
        try{ 
          baos = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); 
          dos = new DataOutputStream(baos); 
        } 
        catch(Exception e){} 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Initializes this module. 
     */ 
    public void init(){ 
      // Register with self as registration listener 
      addPropertyBearerListener(Channel.class,this); 
      super.init(); 
    } 
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    /** 
     * Takes the given packet, and adds the application ID and a sequence number 
     * to the data then sends the new packet on its way 
     * 
     * @param packet the packet to be sent 
     * @exception IOException if an error occurs 
     */ 
    public synchronized void sendPacket(DataPacket packet) throws IOException 
    { 
 
      // if the filter is ok to transmit 
      if (okToTransmit){ 
        byte[] dataArray = new byte[1]; 
        try{ 
 
          //gets the data from the packet, and appends the applicationID and sequence 
          //   number to the beginning 
          byte[] packetData = packet.getData(); 
          baos.reset(); 
          dos.writeLong(applicationID); 
          dos.writeInt(seqNum); 
          dos.write(packetData,0,packetData.length); 
          dataArray = baos.toByteArray(); 
 
          // if the sequnce number is the Maximum Integer Value, then assign it the 
          //   Minimum integer Value, else increment it.  This 'roll-over' ensures 
          //  sequence number continuity when the maximum value has been reached 
          if(seqNum == Integer.MAX_VALUE){ 
            seqNum = Integer.MIN_VALUE; 
            this.println("Sequence Number rollover"); 
          } 
          else {seqNum++;} 
        } 
        catch(Exception e){} 
 
        // create a new packet with the enciphered data 
        DataPacket dp = new DataPacket(dataArray); 
        dp.setLength(dataArray.length); 
        dp.setOffset(0); 
 
        // send the enciphered data packet out to the listening channels 
        Enumeration enum = getPropertyBearers(Channel.class); 
        while(enum.hasMoreElements()) 
        { 
          try 
          { 
            ((Channel)enum.nextElement()).sendPacket(dp); 
          } 
          catch(IOException ioe) 
          { 
            System.out.println(ioe); 
          } 
        } 
      } 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Called when a packet is received. 
     * 
     * @param c the channel on which the packet was received 
     * @param packet the received packet 
     */ 
    public void packetReceived(Channel c, DataPacket packet) 
    { 
      try{ 
        if (okToReceive){ 
 
          // extract the data from the packet into the correctly sized array 
          byte[] dataArray = new byte[packet.getLength()]; 
          System.arraycopy(packet.getData(), 0, 
                           dataArray, 0, packet.getLength()); 
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          //extract the applicationID, sequence number, and clear data from the 
          //   deciphered data array 
          ByteArrayInputStream bais = new ByteArrayInputStream(dataArray); 
          DataInputStream dis = new DataInputStream(bais); 
          long appID = dis.readLong(); 
          int sequenceNum = dis.readInt(); 
          byte[] newData = new byte[dis.available()]; 
          dis.read(newData); 
 
          // check the sequence number & ID of the packet 
          boolean packetOK = this.checkIDandSequence(appID,sequenceNum); 
 
          // if there actually is data, and the packet is ok to send, then 
          //   package it into a new packet and send it on 
          if ((newData != null) &&(packetOK) ){ 
            DataPacket dp = new DataPacket(newData); 
            dp.setLength(newData.length); 
            dp.setOffset(0); 
 
            Enumeration enum = receivedPacketListeners.elements(); 
            while(enum.hasMoreElements()) 
            { 
              ((ReceivedPacketListener)enum.nextElement()).packetReceived(this,dp); 
            } 
          } 
        } 
      } 
      catch(Exception e){ 
        System.out.println(e); 
      } 
    } 
 
 
    /** 
     * checks the sequence number of the given applicationID to prevent replay 
     * 
     * @param appID   the applicationID 
     * @param seqNum  the sequence number 
     * 
     * @return boolean true if the sequence # is good, 
     *                 false if the sequence number is bad 
     */ 
     private boolean checkIDandSequence(long appID, int seqNum){ 
      Long appIDNum = new Long(appID); 
      Integer seqNumber = new Integer(seqNum); 
 
      // if the packet is this application's own packet, reject it 
      if (applicationID == appID) { 
        return false; 
      } 
 
      // if the packet's application ID is already known, then check the 
      //   sequence number 
      if(appSequenceTable.containsKey(appIDNum)){ 
        Integer lastSeq = (Integer) appSequenceTable.get(appIDNum); 
        int lastSeqNum = lastSeq.intValue(); 
 
        // if the last packet's sequence number is less than this packet's 
        //    sequence number by 20, then the packet is good; replace the sequence 
        //    number in the table with the new one 
        int difference = (seqNum - lastSeqNum); 
 
        // this covers all cases if the last sequence number is below 
        //    (Max Integer value - 20), and if both sequence numbers 
        //    are greater than 0. 
        if((difference > 0) && (difference < 20)){ 
          Integer temp = (Integer)appSequenceTable.put(appIDNum,seqNumber); 
          return true; 
        } 
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        // this covers the times when the old sequence number is greater than 
        //    (Max Integer value - 20), and the new number is less than zero 
        //     ie. the rollover area 
        else if (((Integer.MAX_VALUE - lastSeqNum) < 20) && (seqNum < 0)){ 
          int buffer = Integer.MAX_VALUE - lastSeqNum; 
          if(seqNum < (Integer.MIN_VALUE + (20-buffer))){ 
            Integer temp = (Integer)appSequenceTable.put(appIDNum,seqNumber); 
            this.println(" sequence rollover for app " + appID); 
            return true; 
          } 
        } 
        // else the packet is out of sequence and is rejected 
        else { 
          this.println("out-of-order sequence number; "); 
          System.out.println("old: " + lastSeq.intValue() + " new: " + seqNum); 
          return false; 
        } 
      } 
 
      // if this is the first time seeing this application ID, then place the 
      //   data into the table 
      else{ 
        this.println("new ApplicationID discovered; adding to table"); 
        appSequenceTable.put(appIDNum,seqNumber); 
      } 
      return true; 
    } 
 
 
    /** 
     * Adds a listener to the list of objects interested 
     * in incoming packets. 
     * 
     * @param rcl the listener object to add 
     */ 
    public void addReceivedPacketListener(ReceivedPacketListener rcl) 
    { 
        receivedPacketListeners.add(rcl); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Removes a listener object from the list of objects 
     * interested in incoming packets. 
     * 
     * @param rcl the listener object to remove 
     */ 
    public void removeReceivedPacketListener(ReceivedPacketListener rcl) 
    { 
        receivedPacketListeners.remove(rcl); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Invoked when a property bearer is registered. 
     * 
     * @param pbre the event object 
     */ 
    public void propertyBearerRegistered(PropertyBearerRegistrationEvent pbre) 
    { 
        ((Channel)pbre.getRegisteredPropertyBearer()).addReceivedPacketListener(this); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Invoked when a property bearer is deregistered. 
     * 
     * @param pbde the event object 
     */ 
    public void propertyBearerDeregistered(PropertyBearerDeregistrationEvent pbde) 
    { 
        ((Channel)pbde.getDeregisteredPropertyBearer()). 
                                               removeReceivedPacketListener(this); 
    } 
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    /** 
     * Begins the transmission of packets 
     */ 
    public void beginPacketTransmission(){ 
      okToTransmit = true; 
      this.println("begin transmit **"); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Stops the transmission of packets 
     */ 
    public void endPacketTransmission(){ 
      okToTransmit = false; 
      this.println("end transmit **"); 
    } 
    /** 
     * Begins the reception of packets 
     */ 
    public void beginPacketReception(){ 
      okToReceive = true; 
      this.println("begin receive **"); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Stops the reception of packets 
     */ 
    public void endPacketReception(){ 
      okToReceive = false; 
      this.println("end receive **"); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Sets the applications' ID 
     * 
     * @param id  the application's id 
     */ 
    public void setApplicationID(long id){ 
      applicationID = id; 
      this.println("Application ID set: " + applicationID); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * sets the Filter's ID, and register the filter with the security manager 
     * 
     * @param  id  the filter's id 
     */ 
    public void setID(String id){ 
      filterID = id; 
      this.println("filter ID set to: " + filterID); 
      this.println("registering with SM"); 
      securityManager = (SecurityManager) getServiceProvider(SecurityManager.class); 
      securityManager.addSecureSubscriber(this); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * gets the filter's ID 
     * 
     * @return String the filter's id 
     */ 
     public String getID(){ 
      return filterID; 










    /** 
     * returns the filter's type as identified in the 
     *  SecurityManagerSubscriber Interface 
     * 
     * @return int  the filter's type 
     */ 
    public int getFilterType(){ 
      return this.SEQUENCE_FILTER_TYPE; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * An empty method. must be implemented due to interface 
     */ 
    public SecretKeyPack getCurrentKeyPack(){ 
      return null; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * An empty method. must be implemented due to interface 
     */ 
    public Vector getAllKeyPacks() { 
      return null; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * An empty method. must be implemented due to interface 
     */ 
    public synchronized void addKeyPack(SecretKeyPack keyPack){ 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Synonymous with 'System.out.println', only it produces a class 
     * specific header before the passed String for ease of output 
     * identification 
     * 
     * @param aLine   the String to print out 
     */ 
    private void println(String aLine){ 
 
      // call the 'print' method, passing the provided String object 
      //   concatenated with a carriage return 
      this.print(aLine.concat("\n")); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Synonymous with 'System.out.print', only it produces a class 
     * specific header before the passed String for ease of output 
     * identification 
     * 
     * @param aLine   the String to print out 
     */ 
    private void print(String aLine){ 
      System.out.print("  Sequence Filter (" + filterID + "): " + aLine); 
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 * A filter channel that performs integrity operations on data packets.  It uses 
 * the MessageDigest object to generate and verify message digests.  This 
 * implementation uses the default algorithm of SHA, which produces a 20-byte 
 * message digest.  The algorithm also places one-byte in the beginning of the 
 * data array that indicates the size of the digest. 
 * 
 * This class can only function if a SecurityManager object is included in 
 *  the application structure. 
 * Does not register with the securityManager until the setID method is called 
 * by the XML configuration file 
 * 
 * the 'filter' functionality is based on the aggregate filter authored 
 * by Andrzej Kapolka 
 * @author Ernesto Salles 
 */ 
 
public class IntegrityFilter extends ModuleContainer 
                                implements Channel, ReceivedPacketListener, 
                                           PropertyBearerListener, 
                                           SecurityManagerSubscriber{ 
 
    /** 
    * boolean used to signal the filter to transmit 
    */ 
    boolean okToTransmit; 
 
    /** 
     * boolean used to signal the filter to receive 
     */ 
    boolean okToReceive; 
 
    /** 
     * The application ID 
     */ 
    long applicationID; 
 
    /** 
     * The filter's ID 
     */ 
    String filterID; 
 
    /** 
     * The list of channel listeners. 
     */ 
    private Vector receivedPacketListeners; 
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    /** 
     * The SecurityManager 
     */ 
    private SecurityManager securityManager; 
 
    /** 
     * the stream used to create byte arrays 
     */ 
    ByteArrayOutputStream baos; 
 
    /** 
     * used to input data into the baos 
     */ 
    DataOutputStream dos; 
 
    /** 
     * message digest generator used for transmission 
     */ 
    MessageDigest transmitMessageDigester; 
 
    /** 
     * message digest generator used for verifying incomming data 
     */ 
    MessageDigest messageDigestChecker; 
 
    /** 
     * Constructor.  initializes the required objects and turns off the filter 
     */ 
    public IntegrityFilter() 
    { 
      try{ 
        transmitMessageDigester = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA"); 
        messageDigestChecker = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA"); 
        receivedPacketListeners = new Vector(); 
        this.endPacketTransmission(); 
        this.endPacketReception(); 
        applicationID = 0; 
        baos = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); 
        dos = new DataOutputStream(baos); 
      } 
      catch(Exception e){} 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Initializes this module. 
     */ 
    public void init() 
    { 
      // Register with self as registration listener 
      addPropertyBearerListener(Channel.class,this); 
      super.init(); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Sends a packet over this channel. 
     * 
     * @param packet the packet to be sent 
     * @exception IOException if an error occurs 
     */ 
    public synchronized void sendPacket(DataPacket packet) throws IOException 
    { 
      // if it is ok to transmit then create the digest and new packet and send it 
      if (okToTransmit){ 
        byte[] dataArray = new byte[1]; 
        try{ 
 
          //gets the data from the packet, then feeds it to the message digest 
          //   generator and retrieve the digest 
          byte[] packetData = packet.getData(); 
          transmitMessageDigester.update(packetData); 
          byte[] digest = transmitMessageDigester.digest(); 
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          // reset the byteArrayOutputStream and generate the new byteArray, 
          //  first the digest length, then the digest, and finally the data array 
          //   Then get the new data array 
          baos.reset(); 
          dos.writeByte(digest.length); 
          dos.write(digest,0,digest.length); 
          dos.write(packetData,0,packetData.length); 
          dataArray = baos.toByteArray(); 
        } 
        catch(Exception e){} 
 
        // create a new packet with the data 
        DataPacket dp = new DataPacket(dataArray); 
        dp.setLength(dataArray.length); 
        dp.setOffset(0); 
 
        // send the data packet out to the listening channels 
        Enumeration enum = getPropertyBearers(Channel.class); 
 
        while(enum.hasMoreElements()) 
        { 
          try 
          { 
            ((Channel)enum.nextElement()).sendPacket(dp); 
          } 
          catch(IOException ioe) 
          { 
            System.out.println(ioe); 
          } 
        } 
      } 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Called when a packet is received. 
     * 
     * @param c the channel on which the packet was received 
     * @param packet the received packet 
     */ 
    public void packetReceived(Channel c, DataPacket packet) 
    { 
      try{ 
        if (okToReceive){ 
 
          // extract the data from the packet into the correctly sized array 
          byte[] dataArray = new byte[packet.getLength()]; 
          System.arraycopy(packet.getData(), 0, 
                         dataArray, 0, packet.getLength()); 
 
          //extract the digest length, digest, and data from the packet array 
          ByteArrayInputStream bais = new ByteArrayInputStream(dataArray); 
          DataInputStream dis = new DataInputStream(bais); 
          int digestLength = new Byte(dis.readByte()).intValue(); 
          byte[] digest = new byte[digestLength]; 
          dis.read(digest); 
          byte[] newData = new byte[dis.available()]; 
          dis.read(newData); 
 
          // check the sequence number & ID of the packet 
          boolean packetOK = this.verifyDigest(digest,newData); 
 
          // if there actually is data, and the packet is ok to send, then 
          //   package it into a new packet 
          DataPacket dp = new DataPacket(newData); 
          dp.setLength(newData.length); 






          // if the packet is OK to keep sending, then send it 
          if (packetOK){ 
            Enumeration enum = receivedPacketListeners.elements(); 
            while(enum.hasMoreElements()) 
            { 
              ((ReceivedPacketListener)enum.nextElement()).packetReceived(this,dp); 
            } 
          } 
          else {this.println("Integrity check failed");} 
        } 
      } 
      catch(Exception e){ 
        e.printStackTrace(); 
      } 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Generates a digest of the provided data array, and compares it to 
     *  the provided digest.  Returns true is the match, false if not 
     * 
     * @param digest    the digest to compare the new one to 
     * @param data      the data to verify 
     * @return boolean  the verdict 
     */ 
    private boolean verifyDigest(byte[] digest, byte[] data){ 
      messageDigestChecker.update(data); 
      if (MessageDigest.isEqual(messageDigestChecker.digest(),digest)){ 
        return true; 
      } 
      return false; 
     } 
 
    /** 
     * Adds a listener to the list of objects interested 
     * in incoming packets. 
     * 
     * @param rcl the listener object to add 
     */ 
    public void addReceivedPacketListener(ReceivedPacketListener rcl) 
    { 
        receivedPacketListeners.add(rcl); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Removes a listener object from the list of objects 
     * interested in incoming packets. 
     * 
     * @param rcl the listener object to remove 
     */ 
    public void removeReceivedPacketListener(ReceivedPacketListener rcl) 
    { 
        receivedPacketListeners.remove(rcl); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Invoked when a property bearer is registered. 
     * 
     * @param pbre the event object 
     */ 
    public void propertyBearerRegistered(PropertyBearerRegistrationEvent pbre) 
    { 
        ((Channel)pbre.getRegisteredPropertyBearer()).addReceivedPacketListener(this); 










    /** 
     * Invoked when a property bearer is deregistered. 
     * 
     * @param pbde the event object 
     */ 
    public void propertyBearerDeregistered(PropertyBearerDeregistrationEvent pbde) 
    { 
        ((Channel)pbde.getDeregisteredPropertyBearer()). 
                                               removeReceivedPacketListener(this); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Begins the transmission of packets 
     */ 
    public void beginPacketTransmission(){ 
      okToTransmit = true; 
      this.println("begin transmit **"); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Stops the transmission of packets 
     */ 
    public void endPacketTransmission(){ 
      okToTransmit = false; 
      this.println("end transmit **"); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Begins the reception of packets 
     */ 
    public void beginPacketReception(){ 
      okToReceive = true; 
      this.println("begin receive **"); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Stops the reception of packets 
     */ 
    public void endPacketReception(){ 
      okToReceive = false; 
      this.println("end receive **"); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Sets the applications' ID 
     * 
     * @param id  the application's ID 
     */ 
    public void setApplicationID(long id){ 
      applicationID = id; 
      this.println("Application ID set: " + applicationID); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * sets the Filter's ID, and registers with the security manager 
     * 
     * @param this filter's ID 
     */ 
    public void setID(String id){ 
      filterID = id; 
      this.println("filter ID set to: " + filterID); 
      this.println("registering with SM"); 
      securityManager = (SecurityManager) getServiceProvider(SecurityManager.class); 
      securityManager.addSecureSubscriber(this); 








    /** 
     * returns the filter's ID 
     * 
     * @return String   the filter's id 
     */ 
    public String getID(){ 
      return filterID; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * returns the filter's type as identified in the 
     *  SecurityManagerSubscriber Interface 
     * 
     * @return int   the filter's type 
     */ 
    public int getFilterType(){ 
      return this.INTEGRITY_FILTER_TYPE; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * An empty method.  must be implemented due to interface 
     */ 
    public SecretKeyPack getCurrentKeyPack(){ 
      return null; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * An empty method. must be implemented due to interface 
     */ 
    public Vector getAllKeyPacks() { 
      return null; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * an empty method.  must be implemented due to interface 
     */ 
    public synchronized void addKeyPack(SecretKeyPack keyPack){ 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Synonymous with 'System.out.println', only it produces a class 
     * specific header before the passed String for ease of output 
     * identification 
     * 
     * @param aLine   the String to print out 
     */ 
    public void println(String aLine){ 
 
      // call the 'print' method, passing the provided String object 
      //   concatenated with a carriage return 
      this.print(aLine.concat("\n")); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Synonymous with 'System.out.print', only it produces a class 
     * specific header before the passed String for ease of output 
     * identification 
     * 
     * @param aLine   the String to print out 
     */ 
    public void print(String aLine){ 
      System.out.print("  Integrity Filter (" + filterID + "): " + aLine); 




































 * A filter channel that performs encryption on the provided dataPackets. 
 * 
 * Cipher keys are provided to it through the use of SecretKeyPacks received from 
 * the SecurityManager object with which it is associated.  This class can only 
 * functions if a SecurityManager object is included in the application 
 * structure. 
 * Does not register with the securityManager until the setID method is called 
 * by the XML confiduration file 
 * 
 * For outbound packets, it produces data arrays that are 4 to 11 bytes longer 
 * than the original data:  4 bytes are added for the key ID, and 0-7 bytes are 
 * added due to the padding scheme of the cipher. 
 * 
 * Key algorithms which are known to function within this class are DES, DESede, 
 *  and Blowfish.  Only CBC or chaining mode has been verified fnctional. 
 * 
 * the 'filter' functionality is based on the aggregate filter authored 
 * by Andrzej Kapolka 
 * 
 * @author Ernesto Salles 
 */ 
 
public class SecureFilter extends ModuleContainer 
                                implements Channel, ReceivedPacketListener, 
                                           PropertyBearerListener, 
                                           SecurityManagerSubscriber{ 
 
    /** 
    * boolean used to signal the filter to transmit 
    */ 
    boolean okToTransmit; 
 
    /** 
     * boolean used to signal the filter to receive 
     */ 






    /** 
     * The application ID 
     */ 
    long applicationID; 
 
    /** 
     * The filter's ID 
     */ 
    String filterID; 
 
    /** 
     * The list of channel listeners. 
     */ 
    private Vector receivedPacketListeners; 
 
    /** 
     * Timer used in scheduling key change evolutions 
     */ 
    private Timer keyChangeTimer; 
 
    /** 
     * The current KeyPack 
     */ 
    SecretKeyPack currentKeyPack = null; 
 
    /** 
     * The KeyPacks awaiting to begin use,by order of start time 
     */ 
    Vector nextKeyPacks; 
 
    /** 
     * The current encryption key 
     */ 
    private SecretKey currentKey; 
 
    /** 
     * The timer object used for key changes 
     */ 
    private TimeProvider timeProvider; 
 
     /** 
      * The SecurityManager 
      */ 
     private SecurityManager securityManager; 
 
    /** 
     * The outbound encipher engine 
     */ 
    Cipher encipherer; 
 
    /** 
     * The inbound decipher engine 
     */ 
 
    Cipher decipherer; 
 
    /** 
     * Constructor.  initializes the objects of the filter and turns the filter off. 
     */ 
    public SecureFilter() 
    { 
        receivedPacketListeners = new Vector(); 
        nextKeyPacks = new Vector(); 
        keyChangeTimer = new Timer(); 
        this.endPacketTransmission(); 
        this.endPacketReception(); 
        applicationID = 0; 
        currentKeyPack = null; 




    /** 
     * Initializes this module. 
     */ 
    public void init() 
    { 
        // Register with self as registration listener 
 
        addPropertyBearerListener(Channel.class,this); 
        timeProvider = (TimeProvider) getServiceProvider(TimeProvider.class); 
      super.init(); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * encrypt a given packet and send it out to the next channel object. 
     * 
     * @param packet the packet to be sent 
     * @exception IOException if an error occurs 
     */ 
    public synchronized void sendPacket(DataPacket packet) throws IOException 
    { 
 
      // if the filter is ok to transmit, then encipher the data and transmit 
      if (okToTransmit){ 
 
        // encrypt the packet's datapassed data array 
        byte[] cipherArray  = encipherData(packet.getData()); 
 
        // create a new packet with the enciphered data 
        DataPacket dp = new DataPacket(cipherArray); 
        dp.setLength(cipherArray.length); 




        // send the new packet out to the listening channels 
        Enumeration enum = getPropertyBearers(Channel.class); 
        while(enum.hasMoreElements()) 
        { 
          try 
          { 
            ((Channel)enum.nextElement()).sendPacket(dp); 
          } 
          catch(IOException ioe) 
          { 
            System.out.println(ioe); 
          } 
        } 
      } 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Called when a packet is received. 
     * 
     * @param c the channel on which the packet was received 
     * @param packet the received packet 
     */ 
    public synchronized void packetReceived(Channel c, DataPacket packet) 
    { 
      try{ 
        if (okToReceive){ 
 
          // extract the data from the packet into the correctly sized array 
          byte[] cypherArray = new byte[packet.getLength()]; 
          System.arraycopy(packet.getData(), 0, 
                           cypherArray, 0, packet.getLength()); 
 
          // decipher the data array 
          byte[] clearData = decipherData(cypherArray); 
 
          // if there actually is data, then 
          //   package it into a new packet and send it up 
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          if (clearData != null){ 
            DataPacket dp = new DataPacket(clearData); 
            dp.setLength(clearData.length); 
            dp.setOffset(0); 
 
            Enumeration enum = receivedPacketListeners.elements(); 
            while(enum.hasMoreElements()) 
            { 
              ((ReceivedPacketListener)enum.nextElement()).packetReceived(this,dp); 
            } 
          } 
        } 
      } 
      catch(Exception e){ 
        System.out.println(e); 
      } 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Adds a listener to the list of objects interested 
     * in incoming packets. 
     * 
     * @param rcl the listener object to add 
     */ 
    public void addReceivedPacketListener(ReceivedPacketListener rcl) 
    { 
        receivedPacketListeners.add(rcl); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Removes a listener object from the list of objects 
     * interested in incoming packets. 
     * 
     * @param rcl the listener object to remove 
     */ 
    public void removeReceivedPacketListener(ReceivedPacketListener rcl) 
    { 
        receivedPacketListeners.remove(rcl); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Invoked when a property bearer is registered. 
     * 
     * @param pbre the event object 
     */ 
    public void propertyBearerRegistered(PropertyBearerRegistrationEvent pbre) 
    { 
        ((Channel)pbre.getRegisteredPropertyBearer()).addReceivedPacketListener(this); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Invoked when a property bearer is deregistered. 
     * 
     * @param pbde the event object 
     */ 
    public void propertyBearerDeregistered(PropertyBearerDeregistrationEvent pbde) 
    { 
        ((Channel)pbde.getDeregisteredPropertyBearer()). 
                                     removeReceivedPacketListener(this); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * receives a SecretKeypack and either immediately installs it as the 
     * current active key pack, or places it into the vector of future keypacks 
     * and set's the timer for its active period 
     * 
     * @param  keyPack  the SecretKeyPack to add to the the vector 
     */ 
    public synchronized void addKeyPack(SecretKeyPack keyPack){ 
      if (keyPack != null){ 
        long keyLifeDuration = keyPack.getEndTime() - timeProvider.getCurrentTime(); 
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        // if the packet has not expired, then schedule the key change, else reject it. 
        if(keyLifeDuration>0){ 
          long keyStartDelay = keyPack.getBeginTime() - timeProvider.getCurrentTime(); 
 
          // if there is a delay before the beginning of this key, add the 
          //  keyPack to the Vector and generate a TimerTask for the key to be 
          //  changed to this KeyPack.  If the Vector is empty, then first 
          //  generate a new Timer object in order to schedule the key change. 
          if (keyStartDelay > 0) { 
            if(nextKeyPacks.isEmpty()){ 
              keyChangeTimer = new Timer(); 
            } 
            addPackToVector(keyPack); 
            TimerTask keyChange = new TimerTask(){ 
              public void run(){changeKeys();} 
            }; 
            keyChangeTimer.schedule(keyChange,keyStartDelay); 
            this.println("a key pack has been received;  key change in "  
                          + keyStartDelay + " milliseconds"); 
          } 
 
          // if it's an immediate key change, then drop all awaiting packets, 
          //    cancel the tasks in the Timer, and load the new pack into the 
          //    nextPack Vector.  Then change the key. 
          else { 
            nextKeyPacks.clear(); 
            keyChangeTimer.cancel(); 
            nextKeyPacks.add(keyPack); 
            this.println("an immediate key pack has been received;  
                          immediate key change"); 
            this.println("****Vector has bee zeroed: " + nextKeyPacks.size()); 
 
            changeKeys(); 
          } 
        } 
        else {this.println("a Key pack has been rejected, time period has expired");} 
      } 
      else {this.println("Null keyPack received -> nothing done");} 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * adds a new KeyPack to the Vector of keyPacks awaiting activation.  The pack 
     *   is placed into the Vector in sequential order by time if activation 
     * 
     * @param newKeypack  the SecretKeyPack to add to the Vector 
     */ 
    private void addPackToVector(SecretKeyPack newKeyPack){ 
      SecretKeyPack skp1; 
      int i; 
 
      // go through the Vector and insert the ne KeyPack into its sequential 
      //    location based on beginTime 
      for(i = 0; i<nextKeyPacks.size(); i++){ 
        skp1 = (SecretKeyPack) nextKeyPacks.elementAt(i); 
        if (newKeyPack.getBeginTime() < skp1.getBeginTime()){ 
          nextKeyPacks.add(i,newKeyPack); 
          break; 
        } 
      } 
 
      // if the loop has completed and the index is equal to the Vector size, 
      //   then the keyPack wasn't added into the Vector, place it at the end 
      if (i == nextKeyPacks.size()){ 
        nextKeyPacks.add(newKeyPack); 
      } 






    /** 
     * changes the keys.  First turns off the filter, then it removes the next 
     * KeyPack off the Vector and assigns it as the current KeyPack.  It then 
     * restarts the filter 
     */ 
    public void changeKeys(){ 
      endPacketTransmission(); 
      endPacketReception(); 
      if (currentKeyPack == null){currentKeyPack = 
                                  (SecretKeyPack)nextKeyPacks.elementAt(0);}; 
      synchronized (currentKeyPack){ 
        currentKeyPack = (SecretKeyPack)nextKeyPacks.remove(0); 
        this.println("key removed from vector " + nextKeyPacks.size()); 
        this.println("key change, new key ID:        "  
                      + new String(currentKeyPack.getKeyID())); 
        this.println("key Cipher parameters are:     "  
                      + currentKeyPack.getCipherParameters()); 
 
        try{ 
          encipherer = Cipher.getInstance(currentKeyPack.getCipherParameters()); 
          encipherer.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE,currentKeyPack.getKey(), 
                          new IvParameterSpec(currentKeyPack.getInitVector())); 
 
          decipherer = Cipher.getInstance(currentKeyPack.getCipherParameters()); 
          decipherer.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE,currentKeyPack.getKey(), 
                          new IvParameterSpec(currentKeyPack.getInitVector())); 
        } 
        catch(Exception e){ 
          this.println("**Error in initializing the ciphers**"); 
        } 
      } 
      beginPacketTransmission(); 
      beginPacketReception(); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Provides a byte array containing the key id followed by the 
     * given data's ciphertext. 
     * 
     * @param clearData  the data to be enciphered 
     * @return byte[]    an array containing the keyID followed by the ciphertext 
     */ 
    private byte[] encipherData(byte[] clearData){ 
      byte[] cipherArray = null; 
 
      try{ 
 
        // synchronized around the currentakeyPack in order to ensure the keyPack does 
        //    not change between the .getKeyID call and the encipherer call 
        synchronized(currentKeyPack){ 
 
          // get the active key ID and encipher the data 
          byte[] keyID = currentKeyPack.getKeyID(); 
          Cipher c = encipherer; 
          byte[] encryptedData = c.doFinal(clearData); 
 
 
          // create the cipherArray containing the key ID in the first 4 bytes, 
          //    followed by the encrypted data 
          cipherArray = new byte[4 + encryptedData.length]; 
          int i; 
          for (i=0; i<4; i++){cipherArray[i] = keyID[i];} 
          for (; i<cipherArray.length; i++){cipherArray[i] = encryptedData[i-4];} 
        } 
      } 
      catch (Exception e){ 
        e.printStackTrace(); 
      } 
      // return the cipherArray 
      return cipherArray; 
    } 
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    /** 
     * Accepts an array of cipherData and returns the cleartext. 
     * 
     * @param cipherArray  an array containing an key ID followed by ciphertext 
     * @return byte[]      the deciphered data array 
     */ 
    private byte[] decipherData(byte[] cipherArray) throws Exception { 
 
      // initialize needed byte arrays 
      byte[] keyID = new byte[4]; 
      byte[] clearData = null; 
      byte[] cipherText = new byte[cipherArray.length - 4]; 
 
      // parses out the key ID and the ciphertext 
      int i; 
      for (i=0; i<4; i++){keyID[i] = cipherArray[i];} 
      for (; i<cipherArray.length; i++){cipherText[i-4] = cipherArray[i];} 
 
        // synchronized around the currentKeyPack in order to ensure the keyPack does 
        //    not change between the .getKeyID call and the encipherer call. 
        synchronized(currentKeyPack){ 
 
          // checks for a valid key ID 
          for (int j=0; j<4;j++){ 
            if (keyID[j] != currentKeyPack.getKeyID()[j]) { 
              throw new Exception(" SF: invalid Key ID in incomming packet"); 
            } 
          } 
 
          // decrypts the data 
          try{ 
              Cipher c = decipherer; 
              clearData = c.doFinal(cipherText); 
          } 
          catch (Exception e){ 
            e.printStackTrace(); 
          } 
        } 
 
        // return the clear data 
        return clearData; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Begins the transmission of packets 
     */ 
    public void beginPacketTransmission(){ 
      okToTransmit = true; 
      this.println("begin transmit"); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Stops the transmission of packets 
     */ 
    public void endPacketTransmission(){ 
      okToTransmit = false; 
      this.println("end transmit"); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Begins the reception of packets 
     */ 
    public void beginPacketReception(){ 
      okToReceive = true; 
      this.println("begin receive **"); 






    /** 
     * Stops the reception of packets 
     */ 
    public void endPacketReception(){ 
      okToReceive = false; 
      this.println("end receive **"); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Sets the applications' ID 
     * 
     * @param id  the application's id long value 
     */ 
    public void setApplicationID(long id){ 
      applicationID = id; 
      this.println("Application ID set: " + applicationID); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * sets the Filter's ID, and 
     * 
     * @param id  the filter's ID 
     */ 
    public void setID(String id){ 
      filterID = id; 
      this.println("filter ID set to: " + filterID); 
      this.println("registering with SM"); 
      securityManager = (SecurityManager) getServiceProvider(SecurityManager.class); 
      securityManager.addSecureSubscriber(this); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * gets the filter's ID 
     * 
     * @return String the filter's ID 
     */ 
    public String getID(){ 
      return filterID; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * returns the current active SecretKeyPack 
     * 
     * @return the current active SecretKeyPack 
     */ 
    public SecretKeyPack getCurrentKeyPack(){ 
      return currentKeyPack; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * returns a Vector of SecretKeyPacks, the current one and any others in the queue 
     * 
     * @return Vector  the vector of keyPacks 
     */ 
 
    public Vector getAllKeyPacks() { 
      Vector temp = new Vector(); 
      temp.add(currentKeyPack); 
      for(int i=0; i<nextKeyPacks.size(); i++){ 
        temp.add(nextKeyPacks.elementAt(i)); 
      } 
      return nextKeyPacks; 










    /** 
     * Synonymous with 'System.out.println', only it produces a class 
     * specific header before the passed String for ease of output 
     * identification 
     * 
     * @param aLine   the String to print out 
     */ 
    public void println(String aLine){ 
 
      // call the 'print' method, passing the provided String object 
      //   concatenated with a carriage return 
      this.print(aLine.concat("\n")); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Synonymous with 'System.out.print', only it produces a class 
     * specific header before the passed String for ease of output 
     * identification 
     * 
     * @param aLine   the String to print out 
     */ 
    private void print(String aLine){ 
      System.out.print("  Secure Filter (" + filterID + "): " + aLine); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Returns the filter's type as identified in the 
     *    SecureManagerSubscriber Interface 
     * 
     * @return int  the filter's type 
     */ 
    public int getFilterType(){ 
      return this.SECURE_FILTER_TYPE; 
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